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PRETRIAL DISPARITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONEY
BAIL
MIGUEL F.P. DE FIGUEIREDO* & DANE THORLEY**
Catalyzed by the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, support for
criminal justice reform in the United States has become a groundswell, with
reformers demanding an end to racial and socioeconomic disparities in all
aspects of policing, prosecution, adjudication, and incarceration. While
high-profile cases of police misconduct during arrest remain in the limelight,
a growing and politically diverse chorus of voices is calling for change at the
first point of contact between a defendant and the court system: the bail
hearing. Bail decisions are highly consequential in terms of their scale and
impact on the lives of defendants, their families, and the community. Yet, to
date we only have incomplete evidence of disparities in bail decisions and
their consequences. Without an adequate empirical picture of how bail
decisions are actually made—and how state and local regimes differ in
structure and constituency—even sincere efforts at change will likely be
short-lived and unsuccessful. Critically, we do not know enough about how
judges evaluate whether to release a defendant prior to trial, and we have
little reliable information about how the decisions made regarding pretrial
release affect case outcomes and the long-term behavior of the defendants.
The little data we have is either taken exclusively from or skewed heavily
toward large urban areas. Without more comprehensive accounts to
undergird reform, even sincere efforts at change are unlikely to yield lasting
success.
This Article helps to fill this gap through an empirical analysis of more
than 23,000 misdemeanor bail decisions from a mixed rural and suburban
county in Arizona. Compared to the results of recent studies in large
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metropolitan cities, our findings are striking. We show that despite having
virtually identical caseloads, the most “lenient” judges assign money bail in
only 20% of their cases with average bail amounts of only $200, whereas the
“strictest” judges assign money bail in nearly 60% of cases at an average of
$2,500 per bail assignment (three and thirteen times higher, respectively).
This variability has a racial component as well, with some judges as much as
12 percentage points more likely to assign money bail to Black defendants in
comparison to their white counterparts. And the impacts of these disparities
are not limited to the outcome of bail hearings: Downstream analysis shows
that these judicial disparities have effects on the future behavior of
defendants. Taken together, our findings suggest that for bail reform to be
something more than merely cosmetic, reformers must take aim at high levels
of judicial disparity. At the same time, reformers should be wary of one-sizefits-all policy prescriptions that purport to provide unilateral remedies to all
of the country’s multifarious bail problems, instead recognizing that the
specific relationships between courts and institutions, criminal defendants,
and the broader community likely depend on the underlying characteristics
of those systems and communities.
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INTRODUCTION
The pretrial criminal justice system in the United States is broken. The
most recent statistics by the U.S. Department of Justice show that two out of
every three inmates held in county and city jails have not yet been tried for
their purported crimes.1 By these same measures, the United States is
detaining around half a million pretrial defendants,2 which, taken alone,
would rank the U.S. prison population as fourth in the world (behind China,
Russia, and the United States’ post-adjudication detainees).3 And recent data
show that the vast majority of these pretrial detainees would be released but
for their inability to meet money bail; for example, a 2013 report found that
nearly 90% of defendants in New York’s pretrial system were unable to
afford a bail of just $1,000.4
These statistics are compelling enough on their own, but when
combined with the advent of the coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic and
the groundswell of support for the Black Lives Matter (“BLM”) movement,
the appetite for large-scale bail and pretrial detention reform has reached a
fever pitch. After finding that the COVID-19 infection rate in some jails was
1. ZHEN ZENG, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251774, JAIL INMATES IN
2017, at 1, 5 (2019) [hereinafter JAIL INMATES IN 2017]; see also TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 248629, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 4
(2015) (for data on jail inmates in the United States from 2000 to 2014).
2. JAIL INMATES IN 2017, supra note 1, at 1, 5.
3. World
Prison
Populations,
BBC
NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/uk/06/prisons/html/nn2page1.stm (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
4. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF
LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (2010) (reporting that “[i]n 87
percent of the cases (16,649) in which the defendants arrested in 2008 had bail set at $1,000 or less,
the defendants were not able to post bail at their arraignment and were incarcerated pending trial”).
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eighty-seven times higher than the national average, health professionals
called for the release of any pretrial detainees held on misdemeanor charges,
parole, or probation violations5—a recommendation that many jails have
been compelled to follow due to already underfunded and overcrowded
facilities in which social distancing is virtually impossible.6 And although
the focus of the BLM movement has centered on the interactions between the
police and arrestees, a growing number of voices are turning their attention
to bail hearings,7 recognizing that the first meaningful interaction between
defendants and the court system is a potential lynchpin for racial and
socioeconomic disparities both in the judge’s bail determination8 and in
disproportionate downstream effects.9
To highlight how problematic the current system truly is, consider the
following scenario from the data used in this Article.10 John and James are
alike in just about every way: both are in their thirties and are Hispanic/Latinx
males, neither have ever been convicted of a crime, both live in Tucson,
Arizona, and both were recently arrested for shoplifting. Despite these
5. Letter from Drug Pol’y All. to the Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention (Apr. 9,
2020), https://drugpolicy.org/sites/default/files/cdc-letter-decarceration_0.pdf; see also LEGAL AID
SOC’Y, ANALYSIS OF COVID-19 INFECTION RATE IN NYC JAILS (2020); Letter from ACLU to
State
and
Local
Officials
(Mar.
16,
2020), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_coronavirus_criminal_justice
_-_states.pdf; Marcella Alsan & Crystal S. Yang, Nat’l Comm’n on Corr. Health Care, NCCHCHU COVID-19 Survey of Correctional Facilities: Weekly Report (June 9, 2020),
https://www.ncchc.org/filebin/COVID/COVID_NCCHC-HU_WeeklySummary_6.9.20_002.pdf.
6. A prominent example is the emergency amendment that the California Judicial Council
adopted in June of 2020, which reduced bail to $0 for misdemeanors and low-level felonies (the
amendment has since been repealed at the state level, but many California counties have elected to
keep the emergency provisions in place. CAL. R. CT. EMERGENCY RULE 4 EMERGENCY BAIL
SCHEDULE (2020) (repealed June 20, 2020); see also The Most Significant Criminal Justice Policy
Changes from the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20211224004530/https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.
html] (for updated tracking on pretrial release policies related to COVID-19).
7. Much of the recent energy here has been focused on either promoting bail funds (which pay
the bail for criminal defendants) or the abolishment of bail entirely. See, e.g., Jia Tolentino, Where
Bail
Funds
Go
from
Here,
NEW
YORKER
(June
23,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/annals-of-activism/where-bail-funds-go-from-here (for a recent
discussion of bail funds); Shane Goldmacher, Racial Justice Groups Flooded with Millions in
Donations
in
Wake
of
Floyd
Death,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/14/us/politics/black-lives-matter-racism-donations.html; End to
Pretrial Detention and Money Bail, MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, https://m4bl.org/policyplatforms/end-pretrial-and-money-bail/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2021).
8. See infra note 111 for examples of empirical studies exploring the considerations that
judges make in setting bail.
9. See infra note 193 for examples of existing empirical studies that identify the downstream
effect of bail on crucial issues such as access to counsel, recidivism, employment, and housing
prospects.
10. The defendant and judge names have been changed to maintain anonymity.
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similarities, John was released from jail and is able to prepare for his trial at
home with his family, while James was assigned a bail of $2,000 and will
likely remain in jail leading up to his trial date. Why the difference? John
was arrested on a Sunday and was assigned to Judge Smith, whereas James
was arrested four days later on Wednesday and was assigned to Judge Miller,
who is more than twice as likely to assign money bail than Judge Smith. It
could have been even worse—had he been arrested on that Tuesday, James’s
pretrial hearing would have been assigned to Judge Perry, who is three times
as punitive as Judge Smith. And if James were Black, these discrepancies
could have been even more severe.11 Same court, same crime, same
demographics, different judges.
Further, the consequence of these disparities might not be limited to
whether or not John and James are detained before trial. Does the assignment
(or not) of money bail affect the likelihood that a defendant will appear for
his court hearings? Will defendants detained before trial be more likely to
plead guilty or more likely to even be found guilty at trial? And might that
one difference between John and James—the judge assigned for their bail
hearing—even affect the likelihood that one or the other will commit
additional crimes in the future? What are the implications for legal reform
that will reduce these disparities and improve long-term outcomes for
defendants and society?
Even before the events of 2020 magnified the importance of addressing
these questions, scholars and policymakers recognized that the United States
was coming into what many have called the third great wave of American
bail reform.12 Bail reform has become a buzzword at the lips of everyone
from Democratic Party presidential hopefuls in the 2020 election13 to
conservative think tanks.14 A critical mass of the legal community
understands the need for reform and, just as importantly, policymakers
appear to be motivated enough to actually enact change: In 2018 alone,
11. For a visual representation of these disparities, see infra Part III, Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4.
12. See, e.g., Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490 (2018); Alexa Van
Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release: A History of Bail Reform
and a Prescription for What’s Next, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 701, 701 (2019) (“The
criminal justice system is in the midst of the ‘third wave’ of bail reform in the United States.”);
Jeffrey J. Clayton, The Third Generation of Bail Reform in America: Is Third Time the Charm?,
@LAW NALS MAG. FOR LEGAL PROS. Winter 2018, at 20, 20–21 (referring to the recent reforms
as the “third generation”).
13. Both leading candidates for the 2020 Democratic presidential nomination, Joe Biden and
Bernie Sanders, even made the abolition of money bail one of the pillars of their criminal justice
reform platforms. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., RAFAEL A. MANGUAL, MANHATTAN INST., REFORMING NEW YORK’S BAIL
REFORM: A PUBLIC SAFETY-MINDED PROPOSAL (2020); see also Charles Fain Lehman, Think Tank
Floats Fix for New York’s Disastrous Bail Reform, WASH. FREE BEACON (Mar. 5, 2020, 4:59 AM),
https://freebeacon.com/issues/think-tank-floats-fix-for-new-yorks-disastrous-bail-reform/
(reporting on the reforms proposed by the Manhattan Institute).
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twenty-four states passed legislation on pretrial justice reform.15 A number
of states have implemented new court rules or policies that explicitly allow
judges to account for the financial circumstances of the defendants in setting
money bail.16 Others have suggested that judicial discretion should be
minimized using bail “schedules”17 or algorithms to determine release.18
And, spurned in large part by the tragic impact of COVID-19 on already
overcrowded jails, a growing number of states have even pursued policies
that would abolish money bail and pretrial detention altogether.19 This
collective momentum is undeniably exciting and encouraging.
But all of this happened before. Twice. Galvanized by the growing
concern that too many defendants were being detained before trial, the U.S.
federal criminal justice system began to enact large-scale bail reforms in the
middle of the twentieth century, hallmarked by the Bail Reform Act of
1966.20 Under this “new” system, judges were to use their discretion to
15. PRETRIAL JUST. INST., WHERE PRETRIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE HAPPENING 1 (2019),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/pji/where_pretrial_improvements_are_happening_jan2019.pd
f (“In 2018, 24 states passed legislation relating to pretrial justice, including a major reform bill (SB
10) in the nation’s most populous state, California.”).
16. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1) (effective July 1, 2017) (“A judicial officer may not impose
a special condition of release with financial terms in form or amount that results in the pretrial
detention of the defendant solely because the defendant is financially incapable of meeting that
condition.”); Memorandum from N.J. Att’y Gen. Christopher S. Porrino to Dir., Div. of Crim.
Justice et. al 54–55 (May 24, 2017), https://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/directives/ag-directive2016-6_v2-0.pdf (citing the New Jersey 2014 Criminal Justice Reform Act, which stipulates a
presumption against money bail unless “the defendant is reasonably believed to have financial assets
that will allow him or her to post monetary bail in the amount requested by the prosecutor without
having to purchase a bond from a surety company or to obtain a loan”).
17. For a discussion of the most prominent of these tools, the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool, see About the Public Safety Assessment, ADVANCING
PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH., https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/about/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2021) (see
the webpage’s “PSA Sites” tab, documenting that, as of April 2020, jurisdictions in 19 states use
the Arnold Foundation PSA—including Pima County, the venue for this Article’s empirical study).
18. For a discussion of the role of machine learning and artificial intelligence in determining
release, see Shara Tonn, Can AI Help Judges Make the Bail System Fairer and Safer?, STAN. ENG’G
(Mar. 19, 2019), https://engineering.stanford.edu/magazine/article/can-ai-help-judges-make-bailsystem-fairer-and-safer.
19. See, e.g., S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (California’s recent legislation banning
money bail); see also James C. McKinley, Jr., Cuomo, in Bid to Help Poor, Proposes Ending Cash
Bail
for
Minor
Crimes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
2,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/02/nyregion/cuomo-ending-cash-bail-state-of-the-state.html
(Governor Cuomo’s bid to eliminate money bail for certain crimes in New York). Additionally,
Alaska, Illinois, New Jersey, and New Mexico all ended money bail in recent years. Morgan Baskin,
Alaska Ends Cash Bail System, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 2, 2018), https://psmag.com/news/alaskaends-cash-bail; Maria Cramer, Illinois Becomes First State to Eliminate Cash Bail, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 23, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/23/us/illinois-cash-bail-pritzker.html; Anita
Hassan, New Mexico Eliminated Cash Bail – But Now One County Locks Up More People Without
Bond Before Trial, NBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2020, 5:01 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/new-mexico-eliminated-cash-bail-now-one-county-locks-more-n1250257.
20. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214.
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ensure that all but the most flight-prone of defendants were provided an
opportunity for pretrial release. However, within just a few decades,
judges—assisted by a pair of U.S. Supreme Court cases21—used that
discretion to detain defendants at higher rates than ever.22 Cue the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and its wave of copycat state acts that responded to an
escalating fear of violent crime in America.23 This was the second—and
arguably more informed and permanent—crack at “fixing” the pretrial
detention system, but increased judicial discretion combined with a
preoccupation with fighting crime has led to unprecedented growth in pretrial
detainment and post-conviction incarceration.
As a result, the United States is hungry for criminal justice reform—
possibly more than ever before—but at the same time, poised to make the
sort of change that will only necessitate another movement twenty years
down the road.24 How do we make sure this third crack at bail reform sticks?
The problem is not a lack of motivation; we simply do not have a systematic
understanding of how the pretrial process works.25 In particular, we do not
know enough about how judicial discretion affects the decision to release a
defendant before trial, and we do not adequately understand how the
decisions made at the pretrial stage affect the outcomes of criminal cases and
the long-term behavior of defendants.
This Article attempts to fill these information gaps by providing data
critical for enacting informed and lasting bail reform. We do not purport to
have discovered the national antidote for this country’s pretrial woes—in
fact, one of the themes we stress in this Article is that there is no one-sizefits-all approach that can be unilaterally applied to every pretrial regime in
the United States. We do, however, provide novel empirical data on two key,
21. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (ruling that certain conditions of pretrial detention
such as double-bunking and restricting reading materials do not constitute punishment under the
Fifth Amendment); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (ruling that pretrial detention of juvenile
criminal defendants was constitutionally permissible because it was consistent with New York’s
interest in protecting the community from future crime).
22. SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL IN
AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (2018) (observing that the first wave of bail reforms
“[led] to more denials of bail, not less”).
23. Joint Resolution Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1985, and for Other
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
24. Much of the frustration fueling the BLM movement appears to be the feeling that reform
has become an empty promise because of how ineffectual previous attempts at change have been,
especially in terms of core issues such as racial disparities in policing, prosecution, and judging.
25. See PRETRIAL JUST. INST., supra note 15 (“Passing legislation is just one step, of course;
careful implementation is also needed to realize meaningful and long-lasting pretrial practices that
honor fairness, justice, and public safety.”); Brandon Buskey, Wrestling With Risk: The Questions
Beyond Money Bail, 98 N.C. L. REV. 379, 379 (2020) (“[T]here is no consensus on how to reform
systems that routinely detain people who cannot afford money bail. This is the discussion we must
begin.”).
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outstanding questions in bail reform: (1) To what extent do judges vary in
their pretrial decision-making within a given pretrial system; and (2) what
are the downstream effects that money bail assignments have on the future
behavior of defendants and the outcomes of their criminal cases? We answer
these questions by using cutting-edge empirical techniques and a novel
dataset with more than 23,000 misdemeanor cases from Pima County,
Arizona (where Tucson is located). More specifically, we exploit the random
assignment of bail judges in Pima County to misdemeanor pretrial hearings,
which creates a “natural experiment” that can credibly measure the
differences in how individual judges approach and rule on bail decisions. We
then use those inter-judge disparities to tease out the true causal impacts of
both the existence and amount of money bail on critical downstream
outcomes such as the disposition of the broader criminal case and even the
likelihood that the defendant will commit more crimes in the future.
We find that pretrial judges in Pima County vary remarkably in both the
frequency with which they grant money bail and the average amount of bail
assigned. Despite having statistically identical caseloads, the most “lenient”
judges assign money bail in only 20% of their cases with average bail
amounts of only $200, whereas the most “strict” judges assign money bail in
nearly 60% of their cases at an average of $2,500 per bail assignment (three
and thirteen times higher, respectively).26 And while our study design does
not allow us to identify intentional discrimination across racial or ethnic
groups, our data show that some judges are systematically more or less
lenient with Hispanic/Latinx and Black defendants.27
Furthermore, defendants assigned money bail are slightly more likely to
plead guilty for at least one charge, a finding largely in line with common
belief and prior empirical evidence. However, contrary to the results of
recent studies in metropolitan areas, we find, at best, an unclear impact of
money bail on the likelihood of failing to appear and guilty judgments.28 We
also see a statistically distinguishable decrease in recidivism (9.2 percentage
points) in the six months immediately following the initial appearance of
defendants who are assigned money bail.29 The differences between our
findings and those in similar studies suggest that the downstream effect of
money bail varies across jurisdictions and that bail reformers should therefore
be wary of one-size-fits-all policy prescriptions.30
One other noteworthy distinguishing factor about our study is that we
focus specifically on misdemeanors. Whereas felony defendants might be
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Part V.
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held on bail for crimes as serious as rape and murder, at least three of every
four misdemeanor defendants are charged with either non-violent offenses or
nothing more than minor public-order crimes such as traffic violations and
tax evasion.31 This might lead one to conclude that a higher proportion of
misdemeanor defendants would likely be released prior to trial—either with
no stipulations or with manageably lower bail amounts—but evidence
suggests that this is not true and that misdemeanor defendants are more likely
subject to due process violations during the pretrial process than felony
defendants.32 The necessity of understanding the misdemeanor bail system
is made all the more clear given the fact that misdemeanor criminal charges
in the United States outnumber felony charges five to one.33
We begin in Part I by outlining the basic mechanics and history of
pretrial release and bail in the United States before discussing the current
“third wave” of bail reform and highlighting how we are still informationally
ill-equipped to enact lasting change. In Part II, we describe the design of our
empirical study and introduce our dataset, demonstrating the value of
utilizing the random assignment of judges to bail hearings and emphasizing
the unique nature of and value in studying a venue such as Pima County,
Arizona. We then present our empirical results in Part III and Part IV, which
cover our findings on judicial discrepancy in bail decisions and the
downstream causal effects of money bail, respectively. We discuss the
implications of our study in Part V by outlining some possible prescriptive
remedies that the empirical findings engender, and then briefly conclude.
I. BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL
COURTS
To appreciate the current state of bail reform in the United States—and,
consequentially to identify the questions we should be asking when enacting
new policy—we must first understand the surprisingly rich legal and
empirical history of pretrial detainment. In this Part, we begin with a brief
description of the basic mechanics of bail and pretrial detainment, followed
31. See DORIS J. JAMES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T. OF JUST., PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES,
2002, at 93 (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf; Shima Baradaran Baughman,
The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. L. REV. 837, 841 (2018) (“The vast majority of these
misdemeanor defendants—up to eighty-five percent—are locked up for nonviolent and minor
offenses.”).
32. See Alisa Smith & Sean Maddan, Misdemeanor Courts, Due Process, and Case Outcomes,
31 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 1312, 1320 (2020).
33. See Baradaran Baughman, supra note 31, at 844; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (2015) (estimating that about five misdemeanor
cases are filed in the United States each year for each felony case); see also Jenny Roberts, Why
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 277, 294 (2011).
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by an outline of three distinct stages in U.S. pretrial jurisprudence and
practice: early English and American practice; the first modern bail reforms
of the 1960s; and the second bail reforms in the 1980s. We then provide a
picture of how federal and state courts currently approach bail setting and
release, paying particular attention to the existing empirical data that
highlights flaws in the pretrial system. With this backdrop, we highlight two
empirical puzzles that remain largely unanswered but must be addressed
before the United States moves successfully into its third wave of large-scale
bail reform: accurately measuring disparity in bail decisions across bail
judges within a single jurisdiction and credibly identifying the causal impact
that those bail decisions have on case outcomes and pre- and post-trial
defendant behavior.
A. The Mechanics of Bail and Pretrial Detainment
Pretrial criminal systems in the United States are generally designed to
answer three questions: (1) Who are the defendants in a case; (2) what crimes
have they been charged with; and (3) will they be held or released before
trial? While the first two determinations are often addressed pro forma,34
answering the question of whether and in what form an individual will go
free pending his criminal trial has always been a fraught endeavor and has
recently become one of the key issues driving modern criminal justice
reform. While the factors considered by courts and judges in making the
pretrial release determination naturally vary across jurisdictions,35 pretrial
systems in the United States follow the same basic process.
The process usually starts with an arrest and booking of the defendant,
followed by an initial appearance (“IA”) within six to twenty-four hours,36
where the defendant appears before a magistrate or judge for the first time.
The IA judge or magistrate usually has a host of options available when
setting pretrial release conditions. One possibility, if the defendant shows
minimal risk of flight or recidivism, is to release the individual contingent on
a promise to appear for all subsequent proceedings. This option is commonly
referred to as a release on recognizance (“ROR”). A second option is to
release the defendant subject to specific non-monetary conditions. These
include a wide range of possibilities such as electronic monitoring, drug

34. We recognize that the determination of what criminal charges are brought can (and often
is) quite complex, although at the pretrial stage this complexity is confined primarily to the parties
in the case and is not within the purview of the court.
35. See infra Sections I.B and I.C for a discussion of these factors and how they have varied
across time and jurisdiction.
36. Emblematic of the variation across systems, some jurisdictions explicitly call this a bail
hearing, reserving the title of initial appearance for a later, more substantive hearing (or not using
the term at all).
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treatment, a temporary restraining order, and firearms restrictions. The
measures are typically designed to increase public safety, prevent harm to
victims, reduce flight risk, and encourage rehabilitation.37
A third possibility is that the IA judge requires the defendant to post a
bail payment if she deems the individual a flight risk or public safety threat.
The bail payment is typically 10% of the bail amount set by the court, which
the defendant pays to obtain release. Provided there are no release violations
or missed court proceedings, the defendant will receive most of the bail
payment back; if there are violations or missed proceedings, the payment is
forfeited to the court.38 For those who cannot make the payment with their
own funds or the funds of others, they can try to borrow the money from a
bail bondsman. Commercial bail bondsmen are typically willing to receive
collateral such as jewelry, cars, and real estate, and they charge a nonrefundable amount for their services. Typically, the amount is the 10% bail
payment that the defendant must pay to obtain release.39 If the defendant
does not comply with the release conditions or fails to appear in court for a
proceeding (commonly referred to as an “FTA”), the defendant or the bail
bondsman, who typically acts as a surety, is responsible for the remaining
bail amount. In the event of non-compliance with release conditions or
absence from a court proceeding, the bail bondsman will frequently hire
someone to find the defendant and bring the individual back into custody.
For the most serious crimes, like murder, judges often deny bail to the
defendants, leaving no options for release.
At the end of the IA, the defendant is given an arraignment date, where
the prosecutor’s charges are formally filed, the judge determines whether
there is probable cause, and the defendant enters a formal plea in response to
the charges. If the defendant enters a not guilty plea, the case proceeds to
trial. Throughout the process, the initial release conditions can be
reevaluated by the IA judge, and plea negotiations between the prosecutor
and defendant take place.
The precise timing, the actors involved, and the range of options
available to judges at the IA can vary by jurisdiction. In Connecticut, for

37. Although most courts have a stated goal of only making pretrial decisions based on
probability of flight and public safety risk, in practice, rehabilitation is also a goal based on the
conditions a judge can impose.
38. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 718–19 (2017).
39. Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM.
ECON. REV. 201, 206 (2018).
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instance, police (rather than magistrates) set bail for warrantless crimes.40
The time between the IA and arraignment can vary based on the jurisdiction.
Importantly, the decision criteria that magistrates are supposed to take into
consideration also vary by jurisdiction. While most jurisdictions allow
judges to factor in the flight risk and public safety risk of the defendant, New
York prohibits public safety being taken into consideration.41 Taken
together, although there are patterns in the pretrial process that are similar in
most jurisdictions, there is considerable variation in how each jurisdiction
conducts the pretrial process.
B. A Brief History of Bail and Bail Reform in the United States
Legal systems have long recognized the importance of ensuring the
appearance of defendants at criminal trials, primarily because having a
defendant present at the trial makes post-conviction detention a much simpler
process. So, while criminal justice reform advocates often have a negative
association with the concept of criminal bail, the foundational purpose of bail
is to provide an avenue for the defendant’s pretrial release. Bail was built
upon the presumption of innocence, asserting that all else equal, the court
wants to ensure that a defendant appears for his criminal trial without
detaining someone who has not yet been found guilty of a crime.42
Early Colonial American conceptions of bail had their roots,
unsurprisingly, in revolutionary-period English law. Given the logistical
difficulty in tracking criminal defendants in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries,43 one might reasonably assume that the rates of pretrial detainment
were substantially higher than they are in the age of computers and digital
tracking. However, the English practice of bail was much more liberty40. CONN. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON
PRETRIAL
RELEASE
AND
DETENTION
IN
CONNECTICUT
23–24
(2017),
https://www.ct.gov/ctsc/lib/ctsc/Pretrial_Release_and_Detention_in_CT_2.14.2017.pdf.
41. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2020) (formally restricting bail
determinations to considerations of flight risk and reversal of pending appeals of previous guilty
verdicts).
42. BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 18 (“Traditionally, bail is some form of
property (such as money) deposited or pledged to a court to persuade it to release the accused on
the understanding that he will return for trial or forfeit the bail. The principle of bail grounds itself
in the presumption of innocence and the principles of due process.”).
43. Modern technology, particularly the use of electronic monitoring, has made it much easier
to track individuals with pending criminal trials, thereby making the pretrial release of defendants
more palatable to courts and law enforcement. For a comprehensive review of pretrial monitoring,
including electronic monitoring, see Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be
Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344 (2014); see also Timothy P. Cadigan, Electronic Monitoring in
Federal Pretrial Release, 55 FED. PROB. 26 (1991) (an early empirical analysis of the efficacy of
electronic monitoring); WILLIAM BALES ET AL., A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING (2010) (a more recent empirical analysis of electronic
monitoring, which critiques Cadigan’s approach).
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oriented, and courts put a substantial premium on avoiding “excessive” bail
and assigned bail only when clearly necessary to ensure appearance at trial.44
Some Medieval English law actually banned all forms of pretrial detention,
but a series of seventeenth-century reforms created an enumerated category
of criminal offenses which granted the court the power to keep a criminal
defendant in custody leading up to his trial. This was often the case with
particularly serious crimes such as capital offenses, where the incentives to
flee trial were naturally high.45
Early examples of this approach in colonial America can be found in the
1641 Massachusetts Body of Liberties—the first legal code established in the
New England Colonies—which limited pretrial detainment, “unlesse it be in
Crimes Capital, and Contempts in open Court, and in such cases where some
expresse act of Court doth allow it.”46 These sensibilities carried over into
the advent of American independence, where the first U.S. Congress echoed
the limited and focused nature of pretrial detainment in the Body of Liberties
by extending bail to all but capital offenses.47 As Baradaran chronicled in
her comprehensive volume on bail, “[d]enying bail in noncapital cases was
largely seen as a violation of the presumption of innocence.”48
Over the next two centuries, the primacy of liberty at the pretrial stage
remained unchanged and even made its way into the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence. In an 1835 habeas case, Ex Parte Milburn,49 the Court
emphasized that the purpose of bail was to “secure the due attendance of the
party accused, to answer the indictment, and to submit to a trial.”50 Another
sixty years later, and in response to a growing belief that pretrial detainment
should also be used to prevent high-risk defendants from committing further
crimes, the Court acknowledged a trial judge’s discretion in granting bail, but
reemphasized that “[t]he statutes of the United States have been framed upon
the theory that a [defendant] shall not, until he has been finally adjudged
guilty . . . be absolutely compelled to undergo imprisonment or
punishment.”51 A defendant’s constitutional right to due process included a

44. See Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1156 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated as moot sub. nom. Murphy
v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982) (depicting the development of American bail policies from medieval
English law).
45. BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 19 (highlighting the intuitive rationale “that in
capital cases the death penalty may be imposed and a defendant would have a serious incentive to
flee before trial”).
46. THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES para. 18 (1641).
47. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
48. BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 20.
49. 34 U.S. 704 (1835).
50. Id. at 710.
51. Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895).
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liberty stake in being provided bail except when the risk of flight was at its
highest.52
After a half century without any major developments in the country’s
approach to bail, Congress passed the Sumners Courts Act in 1940, granting
the U.S. Supreme Court the authority to establish unified rules of criminal
procedure at the federal level, resulting in the first Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.53 Rule 46, which governed bail and pretrial detention, marked a
substantial shift in the purpose and application of pretrial detention, allowing
courts to consider much more than the seriousness of the crime accused and
the likelihood of appearance at trial in determining bail. Additional factors
included “the character of the defendant” and “the weight of the evidence
against him” at the pretrial stage.54 Discretion widened even further in
immigration courts, where immigration authorities (not always judges) were
explicitly allowed to account for the potential harm that the defendant may
impose on the community if released.55
As state courts began to adopt these expanded conceptions of what can
and should be considered when determining whether release should be
provided at the pretrial stage, bail amounts began to rise rapidly, and the
number of defendants who were detained prior to trial followed suit.56 This
issue hit the national stage in a pair of cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court
reinforced the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive bail57 but
declined to extend that reasoning to include a constitutional right to bail
itself.58 So while courts were prevented from assigning disproportionately
high bail amounts, the centuries-long presupposition that defendants should
be detained before trial in only the most serious of circumstances eroded.

52. BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 21.
53. Sumners Courts Act, Pub. L. No. 76-675, 54 Stat. 688 (1940) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3771(f)). Up until this point, federal criminal procedure was dictated according to the
Judiciary Act of 1789, under which federal courts applied the criminal procedure rules (including
those governing bail and pretrial detention) of the state in which the court sat. The Judiciary Act of
1789, Pub. L. No. 1-20, 1 Stat. 73, 91–92 (1789).
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c) (1952) (amended 2002).
55. United States ex rel. Potash v. Dist. Dir. of Immigr. & Naturalization, 169 F.2d 747, 751
(2d Cir. 1948); see also 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1946) (repealed 1952).
56. BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 22–23.
57. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) (ruling it a violation of the Eighth Amendment to set
an unusually high bail simply “from the fact of indictment alone” because it “is an arbitrary
act . . . [that] would inject into our own system of government . . . principles of totalitarianism”),
superseded by statute, Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214.
58. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545–46 (1952) (“The Eighth Amendment has not
prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed in this country.
Thus in criminal cases bail is not compulsory where the punishment may be death. Indeed, the very
language of the Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable. We think, clearly, here that the
Eighth Amendment does not require that bail be allowed under the circumstances of these cases.”).
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Even without the comprehensive data collection and empirical analysis
of our day, policymakers and scholars recognized that the liberal use of
money bail would lead to the disproportionate detainment of poor defendants.
In 1966, President Lyndon Johnson famously opined that:
The defendant with means can afford to pay bail. He can afford to
buy his freedom. But the poorer defendant cannot pay the price.
He languishes in jail weeks, months, and perhaps even years before
trial. He does not stay in jail because he is guilty. He does not stay
in jail because any sentence has been passed. He does not stay in
jail because he is any more likely to ﬂee before trial. He stays in
jail for one reason only—he stays in jail because he is poor.59
This sentiment spurned the genesis of what scholars have called the first
wave of American bail reform,60 the foundation of which was the Bail
Reform Act of 1966 (“1966 Act”).61 On its face, the 1966 Act seemed to
revert back to the earlier focus on only detaining defendants—whether
through high bail or non-release—in order to “reasonably assure the
appearance of the [defendant] as required.”62 And while this reemphasis on
liberty appeared to stick at first, provisions in the Act ultimately gave pretrial
decision-makers even more non-flight-related factors to consider, including
a defendant’s family ties, previous criminal record, and ability to pay bail,
along with the weight of pretrial evidence.63 With this added authority, courts
again began to deny bail at higher rates.
The second wave of American bail reform came amidst a spike in both
the perception of and actual rate of violent crime in America.64 While this
reform—and its own Bail Reform Act (“1984 Act”)65—still emphasized that
the true purpose of bail was to allow courts to release all defendants who
could reasonably be expected to appear at trial, it simultaneously reflected
the growing public reticence of releasing individuals who might pose a
danger to the community. The 1984 Act explicitly endorsed what the
Supreme Court had recently deemed constitutionally permissible66 by

59. Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/238665 (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
60. BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 23.
61. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214–17.
62. Id. at 214.
63. Id.
64. For a particularly thorough analysis of crime data during the second reform (the 1980s), see
Scott Boggess & John Bound, Did Criminal Activity Increase During the 1980s? Comparisons
Across Data Sources, 78 SOC. SCI. Q. 725, 736 (1997) (identifying a rise in violent crime starting
in the mid-1980s, which the authors attribute to the crack cocaine epidemic).
65. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 3141–50, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976–85.
66. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984) (while assessing the legality of a pretrial
detention policy, the Court stated that “[t]he ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’ in protecting
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allowing judges to assess “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any
person or the community that would be posed by the [defendant’s] release.”67
Additionally, and importantly, the 1984 Act also mandated a presumption of
detention (subject to defendant rebuttal) for a much wider body of crimes
than just capital offenses. Defendants who had been charged with any crimes
of violence, drug offenses with maximum terms of ten years or more, or nonviolent felonies involving the use of a firearm—among a number of other
conditions—were presumed to be a danger to the community and were
denied bail.68
C. In the Midst of a Third Reform
In spite of the second-wave reformers’ motivations to maintain a system
in which pretrial defendants are kept out of jail when possible, increased
decision-making power in assigning money bail, combined with the
temptation to lock up any individual who was perceived to pose even a slight
danger to the community, proved too great for America’s judges.69 In the
year following the 1984 Act, just over 256,000 inmates were being held in
local jails.70 That total nearly doubled to 507,000 by 1995,71 nearly tripled to
747,000 by 2005,72 and has remained as astronomically high since.73 Nearly
half a million of those inmates have yet to go on trial,74 largely because the
rate at which judges predicated release on paying bail tripled over that same
time period.75 While some of these individuals will only end up spending a
short time in jail—a circumstance that empirical evidence has indicated may

the community from crime cannot be doubted”) (quoting De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155
(1960)).
67. Bail Reform Act of 1984, § 3142(g)(4), 98 Stat. at 1980.
68. Id. at § 3142(e)–(f), 98 Stat. at 1978–80.
69. See Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 12, at 704–05 (“The ideals of liberty and
presumptive innocence part company with the reality of judicial decision-making in local criminal
courts. Judicial officers overseeing bail hearings—driven by concern for community safety and,
even in some cases, by a desire to preemptively punish—have consistently paid less heed to state
and constitutional law than to their own intuition about who is deserving of pretrial release.”).
70. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ
167247, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1997, at 2 (1998).
71. Id.
72. JAIL INMATES IN 2017, supra note 1, at 2.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 5.
75. THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ
214994, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007) (recording that
judges assigned money bail to 23% of defendants in 1990); see also BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU
OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 243777, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES,
2009 - STATISTICAL TABLES 15 (2013) (finding that judges assigned money bail in 61% of cases in
large U.S. counties) [hereinafter FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES].
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still impose substantial harm on defendants76—some studies show at least
38% of felony defendants will remain in pretrial detainment until their
criminal trials.77 Many of these individuals are only being held on minimal
bail ($1,000 or less) but are unable to pay.78
So, despite the best intentions of the second-wave reformers—and in
part because of them—the American criminal justice system again finds itself
engulfed in a debate about how to best assess and treat pretrial defendants.
This “third wave” of bail reform began in earnest in the mid-2010s,79 with
early, statewide policy shifts in states like Colorado (2013)80 and New Jersey
(2014)81 leading the way for more recent reforms in states such as Indiana
(2016),82 Arizona (2017),83 Maryland (2017),84 and New Mexico (2017),85 all
of which limited—sometimes severely—the ability for magistrates and
judges to assign money bail amounts beyond what the defendant could
reasonably pay.

76. See Dobbie et al., supra note 39 (measuring the causal impact of being detained at least
three days before trial); Megan T. Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail
Affects Case Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511 (2018) (measuring the causal impact of being
detained at least two days before trial); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of
Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON.
529 (2017) (measuring the causal impact of being detained at least two days before trial).
77. See, e.g., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, supra note 75, at 15.
78. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 4 (reporting that in New York City, less than 13% of
defendants can afford a bail of $1,000).
79. See, e.g., KRISTIN BECHTEL ET AL., PRETRIAL JUST. INST., DISPELLING THE MYTHS: WHAT
POLICY MAKERS NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PRETRIAL RESEARCH 2 (2012); Timothy R. Schnacke,
Claire M.B. Brooker & Michael R. Jones, The Third Generation of Bail Reform, DENV. L. REV.
ONLINE (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.denverlawreview.org/dlr-online-article/2011/3/14/the-thirdgeneration-of-bail-reform.html (referring to this movement as the third generation of bail reform).
80. H.B. 13-1236, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013) (redefining bail as “a security,
which may include a bond with or without monetary conditions” from the previous definition as
“the amount of money set by the court which is required to be obligated by a bond for the release
of a person in custody”).
81. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:162-16(b)(1) (Supp. 2018) (revising the money bail system to focus
release determinations more squarely on calculations of defendant risk).
82. Order Amending Criminal Rule 26, Cause No. 94S00-1701-MS-5 (Ind. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5,
2017) (limiting the assignment of money bail to defendants who pose a threat to themselves or the
community, are charged with murder, are already on pretrial release, or are on probation or parole).
83. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 7.3(c)(2)(A) (“The court . . . must not impose a monetary condition that
results in unnecessary pretrial incarceration solely because the defendant is unable to pay the
imposed monetary condition.”).
84. MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1) (limiting the assignment of money bail if the defendant is financially
incapable of meeting the amount and that will result in the defendant being detained solely because
of that financial incapability) (amended 2021).
85. N.M. R. 5-401(E)(1)(b)–(c) (“The court shall set secured bond at the lowest amount
necessary to reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance and with regard to the defendant’s
financial ability to secure a bond. The court shall not set a secured bond that a defendant cannot
afford for the purpose of detaining a defendant who is otherwise eligible for pretrial release.”)
(amended 2020).
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If the underlying impetus behind the second-wave reforms was one of
crime mitigation, then the pendulum appears to have swung back to the side
of liberty.86 This shift is no more evident than the recent bail policy reforms
in New York, the capstone of which was the Bail Elimination Act of 2019.87
While evident from its name, the explicit purpose of the bill did not even
mention safety considerations, focusing specifically on “end[ing] the use of
monetary bail, reduc[ing] unnecessary pretrial incarceration and improv[ing]
equity and fairness in the criminal justice system.”88 New Jersey, just three
years after its 2014 reform, took a similar approach after a ballot initiative
amended its constitution to mostly eliminate money bail for pretrial
defendants.89 And with President Biden supporting the elimination of money
bail, the federal pretrial system seems poised for major reform of this sort.90
But there is an increasingly vocal contingent pushing against these new,
more liberty-focused policies. The primary concern on this side of the debate
is, unsurprisingly, the increased danger that the pretrial release of criminal
defendants—particularly those accused of violent crimes—poses for local

86. See Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 12, at 757 (“Strikingly, unlike the push for ‘public
safety’ detention in the 1980s, which was spurred in large part by crime control advocates, this new
wave of reform has sometimes been propelled by advocacy groups and policy organizations
committed to removing financial conditions from the pretrial release decision.” (citing Mayson,
supra note 12, at 492–93)).
87. S.B. S2101-A, 2019–2020 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
88. Senate
Bill
S2101A,
N.Y.
STATE
SENATE
(Jan.
22,
2019),
https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s2101.
89. N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (Supp. 2018) (“All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for
pretrial release. Pretrial release may be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of
monetary bail, non-monetary conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and
non-monetary conditions would reasonably assure the person’s appearance in court when required,
or protect the safety of any other person or the community, or prevent the person from obstructing
or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process.”).
90. The Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s Commitment to Justice, BIDEN HARRIS,
https://joebiden.com/justice/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2022) (“Cash bail is the modern-day debtors’
prison. The cash bail system incarcerates people who are presumed innocent. And, it
disproportionately harms low-income individuals.”); see also Issues: Justice and Safety for All,
BERNIE SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/issues/criminal-justice-reform/ (last visited Jan. 1,
2022) (“Right now, hundreds of thousands of people without a criminal conviction are in jail simply
because they could not afford bail. Young people can spend hundreds of days in jail, only to be
acquitted—yet the severe damage to their lives cannot be undone. This is why Bernie introduced
the No Money Bail Act of 2018 to end cash bail and to end the criminalization of poverty in
America.”). And while President Donald Trump’s “First Step Act” did not address pretrial release
specifically, even conservative policies are shifting towards a more liberty-oriented approach—
while still emphasizing the importance of crime reduction. White House Fact Sheets: President
Donald J. Trump Is Committed to Building on the Successes of the First Step Act, WHITE HOUSE
ARCHIVES (Apr. 1, 2019), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/presidentdonald-j-trump-committed-building-successes-first-step-act/ (where President Trump is quoted as
saying, “Americans from across the political spectrum can unite around prison reform legislation
that will reduce crime while giving our fellow citizens a chance at redemption”).
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communities.91 New York’s Bail Elimination Act, for example, has already
received pushback, and state legislators just recently began circulating stepback provisions that would grant more traditional levels of judicial
discrepancy in setting money bail, presumably to increase pretrial detention
rates.92 The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have “helped” in this regard, as
Andrew Cuomo, the former governor of New York, temporarily scaled back
money bail reform in order to quell concerns about releasing pretrial
defendants from New York’s jails, which have some of the highest COVID19 infection rates in the world.93
This debate is not new: In fact, it closely mirrors much of the argument
that animated the second-wave reform, and the liberty-first motivations of
the third-wave reformers are very much in line with those in the first wave.
The difference, however, is the unified adoption and recognition of the
importance of empirical data.94 While legal empiricists played a role in
developing pretrial policies in the 1980s, reformers and policymakers in this
third wave have an appreciable hunger for evidence-based policies.95 And
the wave of empirical articles over just the last five years suggests that social
scientists are happy to oblige.
The importance of this work is difficult to overstate, but not all data
analysis is created equal. Indeed, the (honorable) devotion to data-driven
change that characterizes many of the policymakers and reformers can
become a crutch. The current debate regarding Chicago’s 2017 reforms is
emblematic of potential tensions between the desire for reform and the need
for watertight empirical evidence. In 2019, the Office of the Chief Judge in
Cook County, Illinois, published an empirical analysis of the reforms,
lauding higher release rates with no associated increase in violent crime.96 In
2020, however, two empirical scholars posted a working paper that questions
these findings, asserting that the original study miscalculated crime rates,
91. See, e.g., MANGUAL, supra note 14, at 8; see also Lehman, supra note 14.
92. See Jesse McKinley, The Bail Reform Backlash That Has Democrats at War, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/14/nyregion/new-york-bail-reform.html.
93. Melissa Gira Grant, The Shock Doctrine Came for Bail Reform, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 7,
2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157205/shock-doctrine-came-bail-reform; see also LEGAL
AID SOC’Y, supra note 5.
94. See Van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 12, at 755–56 (“Unlike in Professor Foote’s time
[the 1960s], when risk prediction was in its infancy, many jurisdictions today are relying on
sophisticated predictive risk assessments in rendering release decisions. . . . Recent state efforts are
novel, however, in that they seek to expand the use of preventive detention by relying heavily on
empirical assessments that have pervaded the pretrial ‘market,’ in order to ascertain defendant
‘risk.’”).
95. See LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., DEVELOPING A NATIONAL MODEL FOR PRETRIAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 1, 5 (2013) (“Our goal is that every judge in America will use a data-driven,
objective risk assessment within the next five years.”).
96. STATE OF ILL. CIR. CT. OF COOK CNTY., BAIL REFORM IN COOK COUNTY: AN
EXAMINATION OF GENERAL ORDER 18.8A AND BAIL IN FELONY CASES 36 (2019).

576

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:557

missing a substantial increase in crimes committed by pretrial defendants
who were released under the new system.97 Caution must be practiced when
analyzing these new policies and systems. Additionally, as we argue below,98
only certain (generally newer) empirical strategies are able to provide
credible answers to some of the most pressing questions related to bail
reform.
D. Outstanding Questions
Despite the fervor and speed with which legislators, policymakers, and
scholars started reevaluating America’s bail practices,99 there are
foundational empirical questions that have yet to be adequately addressed. In
the following pages, we focus on the two issues that we believe are among
the most pressing and, importantly, can be addressed using sophisticated but
tractable statistical techniques.100
1. Inter-Judge Decision-Making Disparity
When discussing disparities in bail outcomes, the vast majority of the
literature focuses on the differences between the various pretrial systems as
described in the preceding Section. This sort of cross-system variation
should not be surprising, as different rules, laws, and decision-makers will
naturally produce differing pretrial release determinations even for the same
crimes or similar defendants.
What is sometimes ignored, however, is the potential for substantively
identical defendants to be treated differently within a single governing
jurisdiction. Under a traditional view of judging, this sort of inter-judge
disparity should be largely non-existent. Judges are often perceived to be
well-trained legal automatons—able to take the facts and circumstances of a
given case and accurately apply the appropriate law to produce “the” proper
outcome.101 But naturally, even the most ardent supporters of mechanical
97. Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Does Bail Reform Increase Crime? An Empirical
Assessment of the Public Safety Implications of Bail Reform in Cook County, Illinois, 55 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 933, 937–38 (2020).
98. See infra Section IV.A.
99. It should be noted (and will be throughout this Article) that the authors find this emphasis
on reform both necessary and refreshing.
100. We acknowledge these are not the only questions that remain, but we feel that these are
among the most critical. Other important issues involve what the role of algorithms should be in
the bail setting process and how they should be regulated, the appropriate measures for specific
types of crime, and the measures that should be taken to mitigate socioeconomic disparities in
pretrial decision-making.
101. See, e.g., Li Zhou, Kavanaugh’s Hearing Is a Partisan Fight, But He Says He’s a “Neutral
Arbiter”
in
Opening
Remarks,
VOX
(Sept.
4,
2018,
4:49
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/4/17818708/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-merrickgarland.
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jurisprudence understand that the judiciary’s humanity will dictate some
small discrepancy in the ways in which judges view, process, and utilize the
information presented to them.102
Scholars have long sought to identify and quantify legal disparities in
arenas other than pretrial decision-making through various methodological
approaches. Racial disparities, for example, are pervasive throughout the
criminal justice system. In comparison to similarly situated whites, African
Americans are more likely to be stopped and arrested by police,103 searched
by law enforcement,104 experience police force,105 charged more harshly by
prosecutors,106 convicted by judges and jurors, and sentenced to longer and
more harsh terms.107 As Bushway and Piehl point out, disparity comes in two
forms: warranted and unwarranted disparity.108 The former involves
disparities that result from legally relevant factors such as the defendant’s
criminal history, crime severity, and crime type.109 The latter relates to
legally irrelevant factors such as the defendant’s race, gender, and
socioeconomic attributes, especially after all legally relevant factors are
considered.110
Figuring out what constitutes warranted and unwarranted disparity is
challenging, but empirical scholars have come up with clever ways to
measure these forms of disparity. A number of studies rely on “traditional”
multiple regression analysis to quantify disparity in judicial decisions. These
studies specify a model where they attempt to control for all factors that a
judge takes into consideration when making a sentencing decision. Examples
include the work of Albonetti; Frazier, Bock and Henrietta; Turner, Secret

102. Originally coined by Roscoe Pound, mechanical jurisprudence refers to the process of
judges stringently applying precedent to the facts of cases without considering the practical or
ethical consequences of doing so. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L.
REV. 605, 605 (1908).
103. Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the New York City Police
Department’s “Stop-and-Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT.
ASS’N 813, 816, 820–21 (2007).
104. Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the
Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 164 (2009).
105. Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force,
127 J. POL. ECON. 1210, 1231 (2019).
106. M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J.
POL. ECON. 1320, 1350 (2014).
107. David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in Their
Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 356 (2012); Dobbie et al., supra note 39.
108. Shawn D. Bushway & Anne Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors
and Racial Discrimination in Sentencing, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 733, 734 (2001).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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and Johnson; and Lee and Ruiz.111 These studies were important in setting
the stage for future work, especially because the literature in criminal justice
during this time overwhelmingly focused on sentencing disparities. One
major limitation of studies of this sort is their attempt to control for every
factor that drives disparity. The results of these models are thus dependent
on how the model is specified, and in all likelihood, are sensitive to variables
not included in the model.
A second wave of studies that rely on quasi-experimental methods
overcome the limitations of this initial wave of studies. Ayres and Waldfogel
offer a market-based test of unwarranted disparity using data from the bail
bond market in New Haven, Connecticut, to demonstrate that judges
systematically hold more Black and Hispanic/Latinx defendants in pretrial
detention than similarly situated whites.112 A related literature examines
unwarranted disparity in police searches. Knowles, Persico, and Todd and
Anwar and Fang, for instance, develop empirical tests that distinguish
between statistical discrimination—the use of observable characteristics like
race to develop accurate beliefs about the unobservable characteristics of
individuals—and racist stereotyping when police conduct motor vehicle
searches.113
In a similar vein to the police search studies (and of particular relevance
to this Article), Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang use data from Miami and
Philadelphia to attempt to disentangle statistical discrimination from racial
stereotyping in bail setting.114 They find that Black defendants are 3.6
percentage points more likely to be assigned monetary bail than similarly
situated white defendants, and when assigned bail, Black defendants receive
bail amounts that are, on average, $9,923 higher.115 Strikingly, they find
white defendants are 22.2 to 23.1 percentage points more likely to be
rearrested in comparison to similarly situated Black defendants, and that

111. Celesta A. Albonetti, Bail and Judicial Discretion in the District of Columbia, 74 SOCIO.
& SOC’Y RSCH. 40 (1989); Charles E. Frazier, E. Wilbur Bock & John C. Henretta, Pretrial Release
and Bail Decisions: The Effects of Legal, Community, and Personal Variables, 18 CRIMINOLOGY
162 (1980); K.B. Turner, Philip E. Secret & James B. Johnson, Race as a Factor in the Judicial
Decision of Bail Amount in a Midwestern Jurisdiction, J. ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST., 2003, at 21;
James M. Ruiz & Joongyeup Lee, Revisiting Louisiana Drug Interdiction: Drug Profiling in the
Louisiana Justice System, 11 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 236 (2009).
112. Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Bail Setting, 46
STAN. L. REV. 987 (1994).
113. John Knowles, Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches:
Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203 (2001); Shamena Anwar & Hanming Fang, An
Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 127 (2006).
114. David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J.
ECON. 1885 (2018).
115. Id. at 1886.
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much of the discrimination taking place is based on inaccurate racial
stereotypes held by judges.116 Their work establishes an important
benchmark for our study in terms of racial disparity in bail setting.
2. Correctly Identifying the Effects and Costs of Pretrial Detainment
Even if policymakers and judges fully understood the inter-judge
disparities described above, informed and efficacious policy-making will
likely only occur when the full set of costs and benefits are also understood.
Policymakers and legal academics have long understood the importance of
this approach, and empirical and economic analyses of the impacts of
assigning bail and detaining defendants before trial have a long history in law
and economics. In some cases, identifying these costs and benefits is a simple
endeavor. In other cases, however, the downstream effects of bail and
detainment are either empirically difficult to measure or are so non-intuitive
that they have been ignored by both researchers and policymakers.
One particularly obvious cost of pretrial detainment is the financial
burden it imposes on defendants. Because defendants detained before trial
are unable to show up for work, many naturally lose their jobs,117 even if the
detainment was short-lived.118 Empirical studies also show that detained
defendants, particularly those who become unemployed, are thereafter likely
to have reduced hourly wages.119 Additionally, many defendants become
more at risk of becoming victims of larceny while in detention, and nearly all
individuals sustain a loss in social standing and reputation.120 These fiscal
and social costs are often imposed on the defendants’ families.121
Pretrial detainment also comes with a fiscal cost to local, state, and
federal governments and, as a consequence, to taxpayers. With every
additional detained defendant comes an increased need for prison staff,
meals, facility upkeep, and a bevy of additional monetary costs. California,

116. Id. at 1888–90.
117. See Arthur R. Angel et al., Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. CIV.
RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 300, 353 (1971); BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, supra note 22, at 82.
118. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
119. See JAMES, supra note 31, at 9 (finding that “71% of jail inmates in 2002 reported that they
were employed in the month before their arrest”); PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS:
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11–12 (2010).
120. Mark Pogrebin, Mary Dodge & Paul Katsampes, The Collateral Costs of Short-Term Jail
Incarceration: The Long-Term Social and Economic Disruptions, CORR. MGMT. Q., Fall 2001, at
64, 64–65.
121. Kristin Turney, Stress Proliferation across Generations? Examining the Relationship
Between Parental Incarceration and Childhood Health, 55 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 302, 314
(2014) (finding that “paternal incarceration is more consequential than other types of father
absence” such as death and divorce).
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which houses a substantial portion of the U.S. prison population,122 reported
that it spends over $70,000 per inmate,123 constituting 11% of its annual
budget.124 New York City spends a staggering $337,524 to incarcerate one
person for one year.125 While the average cost of imprisonment in other states
is not quite as stunning, the Vera Institute estimated that the average yearly
cost per inmate was $33,000 in 2017.126 The figures are put into sharp focus
in relation to pretrial detainment when, as we have previously noted, pretrial
detainees make up more than half of the jail inmates in the United States.127
Another historically significant consideration made by policymakers—
indeed, the factor that played the largest role in the previous two bail
reforms—is the impact of a defendant’s release on both the likelihood of
appearing for trial and on the preponderance of crime (particularly violent
crime) in the community at the hands of the defendant during the pretrial
period. Recent empirical studies show, for example, that defendants who are
held before trial for at least three days are simultaneously less likely to be
charged with crimes leading up to trial128 and less likely to fail to appear for
that trial.129
Historically, pretrial and bail regimes in the United States were designed
to balance these more straightforward costs and considerations. Recently,
however, interested parties have become more aware of additional
downstream outcomes that were either previously ignored or deemed
unlikely. Despite the high stakes of such detainment, it is unclear whether
122. DANIELLE KAEBLE & MARY COWHIG, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T. OF JUST.,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 11–12 (2018) (showing that
California had the second most inmates in the United States (behind Texas) with just over 200,000
state prison and local jail inmates).
123. Associated Press, At $75,560, Housing a Prisoner in California Now Costs More Than a
Year at Harvard, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-prisoncosts-20170604-htmlstory.html.
124. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger, California State of the State Address, C-SPAN at 18:41 (Jan.
6, 2010), https://www.c-span.org/video/?291103-1/california-state-state-address (stating, “[t]oday,
almost 11 percent [of the general fund] goes to prisons and only 7.5 percent goes to higher
education.”).
125. Ben Chapman, Cost of Incarceration Reaches Record High, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2019, at
A12A.
126. CHRIS MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS:
EXAMINING STATE SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 7 (2017).
127. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 502
(2012). See WILLIAM J. SABOL & TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T. OF JUST.,
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007, at 5 (2008) (“At midyear 2007, 62% of inmates had not been
convicted or were awaiting trial, up from 56% in 2000.”); ALLEN J. BECK & JENNIFER C. KARBERG,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., DEP’T. OF JUST., PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2000, at 7
(2001) (“On June 30, 2000, an estimated 56% of the Nation’s adult jail inmates were awaiting court
action on their current charge.”).
128. Dobbie et al., supra note 39, at 211–12.
129. Id. at 214.
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judges and policymakers who determine bail amounts have an accurate
understanding of the costs that pretrial detainment imposes on these
individuals beyond the mere time they spend in jail. While previous studies
have explored such “hidden costs,” they are overwhelmingly observational
studies and are unable to credibly identify unbiased causal effects. Obtaining
an accurate estimate of the causal effect of bail on downstream outcomes is
incredibly challenging.130 Additionally, these hidden costs almost certainly
vary across jurisdictions. As a result, bail policy analyses may be
underestimating or missing these hidden costs, likely resulting in overly strict
bail policies and unnecessary harm to pretrial defendants.
One downstream outcome of assigning bail that researchers have largely
ignored until recently is the disposition of a defendant’s criminal trial. While
it may not be obvious, lower bail and pretrial release may actually reduce a
defendant’s ultimate probability of conviction. Given the potential costs of
remaining in custody, detained individuals may have a stronger incentive to
agree to a plea in exchange for release. Detention also hinders the
defendant’s ability to access counsel and—resulting from limited access to
legal resources, communication, and witnesses—prepare a strong defense. In
addition, a judge or jury may be biased in cases where the detention of the
defendant is known or the defendant is required to wear a prison jumpsuit,
either by activating the stigma that some have of incarceration,131 or by
reducing sympathy.132

130. See infra Section IV.A for further discussion on why this is difficult.
131. Bright offers a particularly vivid description of the process:
In many jurisdictions, when the court calls criminal cases for arraignments, it looks
like a slave ship has docked outside the courthouse. African American men in orange
jumpsuits, handcuffed together, are paraded into the courtroom. In some places this is
followed by a process known as “meet ’em and plead ’em.” A haggard court-appointed
lawyer meets each defendant, talks to him or her for five or ten minutes—in some
instances with other men handcuffed on either side of the client—and then announces
that a guilty plea will be entered pursuant to a deal with the prosecution. The judge races
through plea colloquies like an auctioneer, eliciting waivers of constitutional rights from
people who often look like they do not quite understand what is happening. The judge
accepts the pleas and pronounces sentences.
Stephen B. Bright, The Failure to Achieve Fairness: Race and Poverty Continue to Influence Who
Dies, 11 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 23, 27 (2008).
132. See Kateri Schafer, The Effect of Defendant’s Courtroom Attire on Jurors’ Verdicts (2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.542.7322&rep=rep1&type=pdf
(describing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), a U.S. Supreme Court case where the majority
held that it was unconstitutional to compel a defendant to wear prison clothing before a jury, while
also stating that defendants voluntarily wore the attire in order to win over their sympathy); see also
Michael Mueller-Smith, The Criminal and Labor Market Impacts of Incarceration (Aug. 18, 2015)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://sites.lsa.umich.edu/mgms/wpcontent/uploads/sites/283/2015/09/incar.pdf.
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More recently, empiricists have also suggested that spending time
behind bars before trial—even as little as five days—can have a substantial
impact on the likelihood that a defendant recommits a crime while awaiting
trial and even may have a substantial impact on the chances of recidivating
after trial. While a long line of work examines this inquiry, a literature review
on the relationship between incarceration and recidivism by Nagin, Cullen,
and Jonson characterized the state of the research in the following manner:
“Remarkably little is known about the effects of imprisonment on
reoffending. The existing research is limited in size, in quality, [and] in its
insights into why a prison term might be criminogenic or preventative.”133
Understanding the conditions under which incarceration is rehabilitative or
criminogenic is challenging for a number of reasons. Perhaps the biggest
challenge is that there are many unobserved factors that drive recidivism that
are unrelated to an individual’s incarceration. These could include the
individual’s family situation, peer group outside of prison, employment
situation, and numerous other factors. These factors, which might be highly
correlated with one’s being imprisoned (and often with the likelihood of
being assigned a manageable bail amount), could independently be driving
recidivism, rather than the individual’s incarceration itself. The resulting
situation presents challenges for those trying to isolate the effect of
incarceration on recidivism.134
Empirical work on the effect of incarceration on recidivism has been
mixed.135 Using the random assignment of judges to cases and comparing
judges who have similar caseloads but vary in their leniency with defendants,
Green and Winik examined the effect of juvenile incarceration on recidivism
in Washington, D.C., and found no statistically distinguishable effects.136
Loeffler had similar results when examining the effect of adult incarceration
on recidivism in Cook County, Illinois.137 By contrast, Aizer and Doyle
(studying Cook County, Illinois) and Mueller-Smith (studying Harris
County, Texas) examined the effects of juvenile and adult incarceration,
133. Daniel S. Nagin, Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Imprisonment and Reoffending,
38 CRIME & JUST. 115, 115 (2009).
134. A second more practical concern is the availability of data that is required to investigate the
question, since obtaining a data set with a sufficiently long time series that has individual-level data
and links criminal data with employment data can be challenging to obtain. See Manudeep Bhuller
et al., Incarceration, Recidivism, and Employment, 128 J. POL. ECON. 1269, 1270 (2020).
135. A long line of research explores this question. For a review of this literature, see Nagin et
al., supra note 133; and Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the
Literature, 55 J. ECON. LIT. 5 (2017).
136. Donald P. Green & Daniel Winik, Using Random Judge Assignments to Estimate the Effects
of Incarceration and Probation on Recidivism Among Drug Offenders, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 357
(2010).
137. Charles E. Loeffler, Does Imprisonment Alter the Life Course? Evidence on Crime and
Employment from a Natural Experiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 137 (2013).
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finding that incarceration increased recidivism.138 These studies also use a
similar methodology of comparing randomly assigned judges. Finally,
Bhuller et al., examining the effect of incarceration on recidivism in Norway,
found that incarceration reduces the probability of recidivism.139
A host of reasons could explain why the results differ across these
settings.140 In all likelihood, context-specific factors that could be structural
or contingent account for differences across the studies. One possibility is
that incarceration conditions could vary markedly by location. The extent to
which a penal system focuses on punishment and incapacitation versus
rehabilitation and reentry can vary greatly by jurisdiction. In addition, the
reentry support, labor market, community dynamics, and criminal markets all
differ, and are just some of the important determinants of recidivism.
Regarding the effect of bail, two recent papers with experimental
research designs obtained different results when they examined the effect of
bail and pretrial release on recidivism. Gupta, Hansman, and Frenchman
found that higher money bail increased rearrest probability by 0.7 percentage
points (9%) when they pooled data from Philadelphia and Pittsburgh.141
Dobbie, Goldin and Yang found that pretrial release has no statistically
distinguishable impact on recidivism, but they did find that pretrial release
increases rearrest probability by 7.6 percentage points (37.6%) during the
pretrial period.142 Taken together, the work shows modest or no statistically
distinguishable effects of rearrest recidivism after the pretrial period.
II. STUDY OBJECTIVES, VENUE, AND DATA
As we have argued above, effective and long-lasting bail reform can
only be accomplished through informed and systematic analyses of our
current pretrial systems, acknowledging the conditions where they succeed
and where they fail. To contribute to this effort and illustrate the importance
of conducting these policy analyses in a variety of geographical and

138. Anna Aizer & Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Juvenile Incarceration, Human Capital, and Future
Crime: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 130 Q.J. ECON. 759 (2015); Mueller-Smith,
supra note 132.
139. See Bhuller et al., supra note 134.
140. It is worth noting that there are also a number of statistical issues that are important to
consider. Bhuller et al., supra note 134, at 1274, point out that Green and Winik, supra note 136,
have a small sample size and weak instrument, and they also mention a point made by MuellerSmith, supra note 132, at 2, that instrumental variable estimates could be biased because they violate
two important assumptions of instrumental variables (“IV”) analysis: (1) exclusion and (2)
monotonicity. The IV methodology is discussed in greater depth in infra, Section IV.A.
141. Arpit Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail:
Evidence from Judge Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471, 471–73 (2016). The authors do not
have results on the pretrial period exclusively.
142. Dobbie et al., supra note 39.
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institutional contexts, we spend much of the remainder of this Article
presenting original results from an experimental empirical study of the
pretrial justice system in Pima County, Arizona. This Part commences the
analysis by introducing the Pima County pretrial process. We explain why
Pima County is a particularly important source of data both for the purposes
of our specific empirical approach, at least compared to the venues featured
in similar empirical studies and as a venue that differs from those in previous
studies in location and demographic composition. We also explore some
illuminative descriptive data that provide the context for more technical
statistical analyses covered later in Parts III and IV.
A. Why Pima County?
The empirical strategies we employ in this Article place a substantial
premium on making unbiased causal claims. Those strategies, however, also
impose various requirements regarding the types of data we can use and the
institutional and procedural structures of the courts from which those data
come. As a result, the first substantial barrier we encountered in this project
was finding a suitable study venue. After contacting more than fifty criminal
trial court jurisdictions throughout the country, we converged on the
Consolidated Justice Court (“CJC”) in Pima County, Arizona, where Tucson
is located.143
First and foremost, Pima County provided us with access to reliable data
on the IA process (including judicial assignment procedures), the outcomes
of those IAs (including bail assignments), and the criminal history and
recidivism rates of the individual defendants involved in those IAs.144 While
this may seem to be a negligible concern, as nearly all U.S. courts have data
on the outcomes of criminal cases, many do not have reliable data on the IA
process. Additionally, as we discuss in detail below, Pima County’s criminal
justice system featured an ideal set of institutional and procedural
characteristics relating to who makes pretrial release determinations and with
how much judicial discretion. Any jurisdictions (of which there are many)
that require judges to adhere to non-discretionary bail schedules were not
viable candidates, because an IA judge’s relative leniency (our instrument)
would ostensibly have no impact on the amount of bail that an individual is
assigned. For this same reason, a jurisdiction had to have more than one

143. To the extent that empiricists are interested in the information we gathered on the many
jurisdictions that are not featured in this analysis, please contact the authors. We note, however that
these jurisdictions were not featured because they lacked the institutional requirements outlined
above.
144. Related to the data availability, a study of this nature also requires a capable and cooperative
court administrative body. We are grateful to the Pima County Courts for their willingness to be a
part of this project.
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judge involved in pretrial release hearings at a given time period. We found
most jurisdictions either have permanent judges or magistrates whose sole
responsibility is handling IAs, or, just as problematic, assign just one or two
general judges to cover the IA docket for long periods of time (a month or
longer). In the former jurisdictions, there would be no variation in IA judge
assignment. In the latter, there is technically variation in judicial assignment,
but the variation would occur over such large periods of time that the
subsequent variation in bail assignments across judges would almost
certainly be correlated with the pre-treatment characteristics of the cases
within those periods. Finally, our design required a setting where the
assignment of the judge or magistrate at the IA was either random or quasirandom, a requirement we discuss at length in Section II.D, below.
In addition to its adherence with the previously discussed design-driven
requirements, the Pima County CJC is wonderfully suited for statistical
analysis because of how different it is from the locales used in the vast
majority of bail studies up to this point. As a review of the empirical
literature shows, most of the studies take place in large, densely populated
cities and focus on the role of money bail in felony cases. This is particularly
true of the four studies that we have previously identified as having done a
good job at avoiding the methodological pitfalls described in Section I.D.2,
above—all four of these studies focus on a combination of felony and
misdemeanor cases145 in some of the largest population centers in the country.
Dobbie et al., for example, analyzed data from Philadelphia and Miami-Dade
counties, the seventh and eighth largest metropolitan areas in the United
States, and Leslie and Pope looked at criminal cases in New York City, the
largest city in the country.146 Stevenson and Gupta et al. also conducted their
studies in Philadelphia, with Gupta et al. adding Pittsburgh, which is the
second largest city in Pennsylvania, with more than 2.3 million residents.147

145. There are, of course, many cases that feature both misdemeanor and felony charges. These
mixed-level cases are almost always treated as felony cases by empirical researchers and
policymakers because of the dominance that the highest-level offense plays in criminal defense
strategy, plea bargaining, trial, and sentencing.
146. Dobbie et al., supra note 39; Leslie & Pope, supra note 76. For the population data and
rankings for cities and metropolitan statistical areas, see Table: Annual Estimates of the Resident
Population for Incorporated Places of 50,000 or More, Ranked by July 1, 2019 Population: April
1, 2010 to July 1, 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/demo/popest/2010s-total-cities-and-towns.html#tables (last updated Oct. 8, 2021)
[hereinafter Table: Annual Estimates 2019].
147. Stevenson, supra note 76; and Gupta et al., supra note 141. For the population data and
rankings for cities and metropolitan statistical areas, see Table: Annual Estimates 2019, supra note
146.
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The CJC, on the other hand, is exclusively tasked with adjudicating
misdemeanor trials outside of Tucson’s city limits.148 Both of these
features—crime type and the jurisdiction’s population characteristics—are
worthy of independent examination. Previous research has firmly established
that the life of a misdemeanor criminal case is substantially different than the
life of a felony,149 a distinction that appears just as substantial at the pretrial
stage, although the literature on misdemeanor bail is admittedly less robust.150
Whereas felony defendants might be held on bail for crimes as serious as rape
and murder, recent data suggest that at least three of every four misdemeanor
defendants are charged with either non-violent offenses or nothing more than
minor public-order offenses such as traffic violations and tax evasion.151 This
would lead one to conclude that more misdemeanor defendants would likely
be released previous to trial—either through ROR or manageably lower bail
amounts. But evidence suggests this is not true, and that misdemeanor
defendants may even be more subject to due process violations during the
pretrial process than felony defendants.152 This is made even more relevant
given the fact that “[the number of] misdemeanor charges vastly outpace[s]
felony charges.”153
We also argue that the realities of pretrial practice—including the types
of defendants and the perception of and interaction with defendants by
pretrial judges—are dependent on the population density of the communities
in which the pretrial practice occurs. This positions our Pima County dataset
148. Limited
Jurisdiction
Courts,
ARIZ.
JUD.
BRANCH,
https://www.azcourts.gov/guidetoazcourts/Limited-Jurisdiction-Courts (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
Note that the CJC courthouse is in Tucson proper, and while there are two satellite courthouses in
Ajo and Green Valley, those courthouses only handle civil matters.
149. For particularly notable views into the misdemeanor justice system more broadly, see Issa
Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351, 353
(2013); ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL
CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2018); and THE LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS
(Alisa Smith & Sean Maddan eds., 2019).
150. Heaton et al., supra note 38, at 732 (“While the Bureau of Justice Statistics has collected
extensive information about more serious crimes, there are no nationally representative data
available on the numbers of misdemeanor arrests and convictions, let alone data about pretrial
detention rates, bail, or sentencing.”).
151. See JAMES, supra note 31, at 3; and Baradaran Baughman, supra note 31, at 841 (“The vast
majority of these misdemeanor defendants—up to eighty-five percent—are locked up for nonviolent
and minor offenses.”).
152. See Smith & Maddan, supra note 32, at 1320–22. See also Erica J. Hashimoto, The Problem
with Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 461 (2013) (chronicling the failure to
appoint counsel in misdemeanor criminal cases); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives From Broken
Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 271 (2009) (attributing due process violations to overburdened court systems and an
emphasis on quantity over quality when it comes to misdemeanor prosecutions).
153. Baradaran Baughman, supra note 31, at 844; see Natapoff, supra note 33, at 1063
(estimating that about five misdemeanor cases are filed in the United States each year for each
felony case); see also Roberts, supra note 33, at 294.
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and analysis as uniquely important in understanding the avenues for bail
reform in America more broadly. In their recent and comprehensive review
of the pretrial release systems in seventy-five U.S. counties, Hood and
Schneider find that “[s]pecific counties . . . vary considerably, both in the
rates at which they use money bail to determine release and in the amounts
at which that bail is set,” and that such variation is better predicted by
demographic and political factors than the individual case characteristics.154
Worden and Clark highlight the particularly unique nature of rural courts,
which differ in “community characteristics, as well as court structure and
courthouse culture, produc[ing] different expectations for justice, and
different patterns of case outcomes, than might be found in urban or even
suburban courts operating under the same statutory and procedural law.”155
And much like how misdemeanor crime is understudied relative to felony
crime, studies of rural and suburban courts take a back seat to studies of
metropolitan jurisdictions.156
The non-Tucson parts of Pima County (again, the jurisdiction covered
by the CJC) vary considerably in population density. The Tucson suburbs—
e.g., Maran, Oro Valley, Sahuarita, and South Tucson—are demographically
similar to Tucson proper, if not slightly less dense, which is a moderatelysized urban area with a population around half-a-million residents.157
However, Pima County also includes satellite towns such as Green Valley
(population of about 25,000), a smattering of smaller towns such as Sells and
Ajo (about 3,000 residents each), and the Pascua Yaqui, San Xavier, and
Tohon O’odham Native American tribes. This is important because it
includes a wider range of rural and suburban segments of the United States
population,158 thereby highlighting the importance of studying bail and
pretrial regimes previously ignored in regions like Pima County.
154. Katherine Hood & Daniel Schneider, Bail and Pretrial Detention: Contours and Causes of
Temporal and County Variation, RSF: RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCIS., Feb. 2019, at 126, 127.
Note that although our discussion here focuses on the authors’ data on current county-level variation
in pretrial regimes, the authors also track the temporal shifts in policy across these counties,
beginning in 1990.
155. Alissa Pollitz Worden & Alyssa M. Clark, Misdemeanor Justice in Rural Courts, in THE
LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS, supra note 149, at 55, 56.
156. See id.; Susan S. Silbey, Making Sense of the Lower Courts, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 13, 13 (noting
that “limited jurisdiction courts are described as invisible, neglected by the bar, scholars and
citizenry, and at the same time as the only judicial experience for most who enter the court system”).
157. While Tucson’s pretrial data are not featured in our study, the city still plays a substantial
role in how we should approach and understand the pretrial system in the Pima County CJC. As of
a 2019 estimate by the United States Census Bureau, Tucson was the thirty-third largest city in
America at a population of almost 550,000, coming in just before Fresno, Sacramento, and Atlanta.
For the population data and rankings for cities and metropolitan statistical areas, see Table: Annual
Estimates 2019, supra note 146.
158. United
States
by
Density
2020,
WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
https://worldpopulationreview.com/states/state-densities/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2022).
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B. The Pretrial System in Pima County
Criminal caseloads in Pima County are handled by three courts: the
Tucson City Court (“TCC”), which handles all misdemeanors within Tucson
city limits; the CJC, which handles all misdemeanors outside of Tucson; and
the Pima County Superior Court (“PCSC”), which handles all felonies within
the county. However, all pretrial hearings in Pima County—regardless of the
level of crime or location of arrest—are initially handled by the judges and
magistrates in the TCC. After arrest or appearance on a warrant, a criminal
defendant’s arrest report and criminal history are compiled. For all
misdemeanor trials that will be handled by the CJC and PCSC, the Pima
County Pretrial Services division also creates a pretrial assessment report.
For those with at least one felony charge, prior to July 2016, the report
included a risk assessment tool developed with University of Arizona faculty
where an individual receives a score between -5 and 70 points based on
demographic characteristics and criminal history.159 In July 2016, Pretrial
Services started using a risk instrument tool from the Laura & John Arnold
Foundation (now Arnold Ventures) for all felony and CJC cases that relies
on nine factors and a risk assessment score ranging from 0 to 27 points.160
Based on the score cutoffs, each defendant is given an assessment of
minimum, low, moderate, elevated, or maximum risk, each of which are
suggestive of certain pretrial determinations.161 Those who receive a
minimum score are recommended for ROR, which is among the most
common pretrial release outcomes in our dataset. In contrast to all other
potential outcomes at pretrial, defendants who are given ROR are simply
allowed to leave after the pretrial hearing with the promise (on threat of
additional criminal charges) of appearing for a future court date. Those with
a low, moderate, or elevated score are recommended for release to Pretrial
Services under a plethora of potential conditions, including release on bail,
electronic monitoring, drug testing, and other forms of court ordered
supervision. Finally, indefinite pretrial detention is recommended for those
who are assessed at the maximum risk level. This later condition is very
uncommon for the misdemeanor cases featured in the CJC dataset—so
uncommon, in fact, that we simply drop such cases from our analysis. In that
regard, the vast majority of misdemeanor defendants in the CJC are given at

159. Interview with Michelle Moore, Manager, Pretrial Servs. Div., Pima Cnty. Pretrial Servs.
(May 15, 2017).
160. For an in-depth description of the Arnold Foundation risk assessment instrument, see What
is the PSA?, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RSCH., https://advancingpretrial.org/psa/about/ (last
visited Oct. 19, 2021). This shift to the Arnold Ventures risk instrument tool comes into play later
in our analysis of judicial discrepancy in Part III (see infra Figure 3) regarding the role that such
tools might play in mediating the discrepancies in judicial pretrial decision-making.
161. Telephone Interview with Pima Cnty. Superior Ct. Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017).
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least the theoretical potential for pretrial release, although the high bail
assigned to many of them practically prohibits that option.
As we outlined above, one of the important attributes of the Pima
County CJC dataset was the possibility of variation among judges in their
pretrial determinations. In this regard, the suggestions made by Pretrial
Services could pose a problem as they may consolidate judicial tendencies.
Although the court administration told us that judges and magistrates follow
the Pretrial Services recommendation about 80% of the time,162 discussions
with non-administrative personnel involved in the criminal process suggested
that deviation from those recommendations is much more prevalent.163 Our
data analysis below demonstrates substantial inter-judge variation in
punitiveness in bail assignment,164 further suggesting that the
recommendations do not impose any serious restrictions on judicial
discretion.
Following the Pretrial Services intake, the defendant is brought in for
the IA. At the proceeding, the judge or magistrate confirms the defendant’s
name, reads the charge(s), and sets the release conditions. The judge or
magistrate may appoint counsel, and in certain circumstances, may hear from
the alleged victims. IAs often last less than three minutes, and in many cases,
the defendants do not have lawyers present. Defendants may contest their
release conditions in a Motion to Modify Conditions of Release Hearing. If
a victim is involved in the crime, the hearing must take place at least five
days after the IA in order to give the victim sufficient notice. For victimless
crimes, the hearing typically takes place within three to seven days. Whether
or not a Motion to Modify Conditions of Release Hearing is held, the
charging attorney then evaluates the evidence to determine whether to file
formal charges in the case. If the case is not dismissed, most defendants then
either have a preliminary hearing or a grand jury hearing, followed by an
arraignment that must take place within ten days of the IA if the defendant is
in custody or within twenty days if the defendant is not in custody.
C. THE DATASET
The dataset we use in this study covers all Pima County misdemeanor
cases resulting from arrests outside the Tucson city limits from 2014 to 2017.
The data itself comes from two sources in the Pima County court system. As
we discussed above, all pretrial hearings are conducted by judges in the Pima
County TCC. Consequently, all the data on the defendant, charges, timing,
presiding judge, and outcomes of the pretrial hearings—including the amount
162. Id.
163. Upon request, we are keeping the identity of this individual anonymous.
164. See infra Part III.
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of money bail assigned, if any—is collected in IA forms (see Appendix A:
Figure A1 for an example). The TCC provided us with all PDFs of IAs
during this period, which we then hand-coded to create a working dataset of
pretrial information.165
We then merged this pretrial PDF data with the administrative court data
held by the CJC.166 The CJC court data included defendant demographic
data, criminal history, and case data. Demographic data included the
defendant’s name, gender, race, ethnicity, date of birth, address, and zip code,
among other information. The case data included charges, court proceedings
(including bail modification hearings), failures to appear, court transactions,
and dispositions. After merging the two data sets, we were left with 29,771
IAs over the time period.167 Table 1 (below) shows the descriptive statistics
for our sample. We report means for the full sample and also for the subgroups of defendants who were and were not assigned monetary bail. The
first set of statistics report the demographic characteristics of the defendants
in the sample. The sample is 74.4% male, 47.3% white, and 36.8%
Hispanic/Latinx. Black and Native American defendants are roughly in
equal proportion in the sample, respectively at 6.5% and 6.2%. Importantly,
the racial make-up of our sample differs markedly from the other locations
where similar studies have been done, with a higher percentage of
Hispanic/Latinx and Native American defendants and a lower percentage of
Black defendants, which might be a contextual factor that could help explain
165. We hired a firm to hand-record these IA forms into a dataset, employing a rigorous audit
process to ensure the quality of the coding process.
166. The use of this dataset comes with three important limitations. First, the criminal history
data only relate to the defendant’s past in the CJC, so our measurements of recidivism (both
charge/arrest and guilty judgments) are almost certainly understating the average defendant’s
propensity for committing crime in the future. Second, because the PDF data did not include
outcomes for the charges that were brought against the defendant at the IA, we had to rely on the
merged case data, which could only be matched with the IA data to the extent that the demographic
data allowed. Some of the PDFs did not successfully merge with the court data, so those PDFs were
excluded from this study. Similarly, our third limitation derives from the fact that we had to
determine which charges in the case data were IA charges but only had “offense date” data at the
charge level. Because some charges originate weeks if not months before a defendant appears in
court, we had to determine whether charges that had offense dates before the IA date would be
defined as criminal history or IA charges. In the dataset we use in this Article, any charges with
offense dates that occurred before or within two days of the IA date but did not have a disposition
date that occurred before the IA date were defined as IA charges. We also ran our analysis on
datasets in which (1) only charges with offense dates within 100 days of the IA date and disposition
dates after the IA date are defined as IA charges and (2) only charges with offense dates within five
days of the IA date and disposition dates after the IA date are defined as IA charges. The results of
the analysis using these alternative datasets—including balance tests, first stage results, and second
stage results—did not yield any appreciably different outcomes. These results can be requested by
contacting the authors.
167. For the analyses in Parts III and IV we omit the 6,092 IAs that did not have judge data or
were assigned to judges who had fewer than 200 IA cases over the course of the study. This resulted
in a working dataset of 23,679 IAs. See infra note 179 and accompanying text for more details.
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different results. The average age in our sample is thirty-five years, and
approximately half (50.1%) are Tucson residents. Roughly one-quarter of
the sample has at least one previous guilty charge, and the mean number of
past guilty charges for the sample is 0.55. Based on demographics, the means
are relatively close for most of the attributes when comparing those who were
assigned money bail with those who were not, with four important
exceptions. The proportion of males, Tucson residents, and those with a
criminal history—based both in terms of whether the individual had at least
one past guilty charge and the number of previous guilty charges—is higher
for defendants assigned money bail versus those who were not.
Roughly half (50.3%) of the sample was assigned non-monetary release
conditions. For the full sample, individuals had an average of 2.72 charges
either pending or brought at the IA. 34.5% had assault charges, 35.3% had
drug charges, 13.3% had DUI charges, 30.2% had FTA charges, and 27.6%
had theft charges at the IA. Individuals who had those charges were more
likely to be assigned monetary bail. Defendants assigned money bail overall
had 3.23 charges, compared to 2.40 charges for those who were not assigned
money bail. The only category where a higher percentage of defendants were
not assigned money bail was DUI, where 13.6% of those charged were not
assigned money bail, compared to 12.8% of defendants charged with a DUI
who were assigned money bail.
Turning to our outcomes of interest—with the caveat that we cannot
confidently compare the two groups until we engage in the more
sophisticated empirical techniques featured in Part IV—we see marked
differences in guilty pleas and FTA rates between the two groups. Just over
51% of defendants assigned money bail pleaded guilty, while 40% did the
same among those who were not assigned money bail. The FTA rate was
10.5% for those assigned money bail versus 12.9% for those who were not.
The probability of a guilty judgment was nearly the same for the full sample
and the two groups: just around 3%. With respect to future crime, defendants
assigned money bail are less likely to be rearrested across all time windows
and are either less or roughly equally likely to receive a conviction after a
rearrest charge. We discuss whether these discrepancies persist after
controlling for the relevant characteristics of the individuals and cases in
these groups in Part IV.
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D. CONFIRMING QUASI-RANDOM IA JUDGE ASSIGNMENT IN PIMA COUNTY
The identities of the pretrial decision-makers in Pima County and the
way in which they are assigned to pretrial hearings is of particular importance
to our empirical study. More specifically, it is critical that the TCC judges
who make the bail determinations in Pima County are assigned to IA hearings
in a manner that does not account for or even reflect the characteristics of the
defendant or the defendant’s criminal case.168 This is because independent
judicial assignment (“quasi-random” assignment in the case of Pima County)
allows us to compare credibly the inter-judge disparities in bail
assignments169 and then reliably isolate and identify the causal impact that
being assigned to a less “lenient” IA judge has on the various downstream
outcomes of interest to bail scholars and policymakers.170 As a result, we
spend considerable time in this Article discussing the assignment procedures
and the outcomes of the balance tests (even relative to the previous articles
using similar methods), while keeping the more technical descriptions of our
approach in footnotes and appendices.
For most crimes in Pima County, after a law enforcement agency arrests
and books suspects, they are scheduled for an IA within twenty-four hours.
IAs are held at 9:00 a.m. and 8:00 p.m. seven days a week at a minimum
detention facility. Defendants, and often their attorneys, participate by
videoconference from the Pima County Jail; the magistrate and prosecutors
are present at the proceeding. There are nine permanent judges and a group
of ten pro-tempore (“pro-tem”) judges from the TCC serving at any given
time. The judge assignment calendar for IAs and other assignments is
compiled monthly in a loose rotation accounting for other assignments they
may have and some scheduling preferences of the judges. Judges can swap
shifts after the initial assignments are distributed, but both in-person
interviews and a comparison of the scheduled versus actual assignment reveal
diversion from the assigned shifts is uncommon. One important worry is that
judges could have sufficient control over their schedules so that they would
not have similar caseloads. If that was the case, the balance results would
show specific judges had a greater share of certain types of cases or
defendants. The rotation system coupled with our statistical balance tests
outlined below demonstrate that the caseloads of the judges are balanced over
the course of the time period we are studying in terms of defendant
characteristics, charges, and a number of other important variables.

168. For a technical overview of the sorts of downstream experiments that we employ in this
Article’s analysis, see ALAN S. GERBER & DONALD P. GREEN, FIELD EXPERIMENTS: DESIGN,
ANALYSIS, AND INTERPRETATION 196–204 (Ann Shin et al. eds., 2012).
169. See infra Part III.
170. See infra Part IV.
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Importantly, defendants also have limited control over the judge to
which they are assigned. After the defendant is arrested and booked, the
individual is automatically assigned to the next IA time. Defendants could,
in theory, strategically time their arrest or exploit timing close to a cutoff time
for a hearing, but the likelihood of this strategic behavior occurring is small.
A number of features of the judge assignment system result in balanced
caseloads across judges, resulting in what is often called “quasi-random”
assignment. Based on the institutional structure we have described above,
the system used to assign TCC judges to the IAs for criminal cases appears
to be conducted in a way where the judges’ individual caseloads were
assigned in a way that was not influenced or correlated with any of the
outcomes of interest and other factors (covariates) that might affect those
outcomes. Nonetheless, the assignment process in Pima County is not strictly
random because IA judges have some control over their assignments.171 As
a result, it is possible this “quasi-random”172 assignment process may
introduce systematic biases into the instrument of our model—the
assignment of judges—that would prevent us from identifying the unbiased
causal effect of our treatment. Such biases might be due to selection effects
(e.g., certain judges prefer to take shifts having a higher likelihood of
171. For a technical definition of random judicial assignment, see Dane Thorley, Randomness
Pre-Considered: Recognizing and Accounting for “De-Randomizing” Events When Utilizing
Random Judicial Assignment, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 342, 354 (2020) (“Statistically random
judicial assignment can be defined as an assignment procedure in which cases are allocated
independently of any value, characteristic, or variable other than an exogenous assignment
mechanism. The specific assignment mechanism used by a court can be any process under which
the probability of assignment is known by the court (or the researcher) and is greater than 0 and less
than 1 (meaning any given case has at least some chance of being assigned to each treatment
category). Such assignment mechanisms are most commonly computer-generated random numbers
but may be as rudimentary as sequentially drawing judges’ names from an envelope (the method
for assigning homicide cases in the Nassau County Criminal Court) or a hat.”).
172. See id. (“As-if random assignment (also known as quasi-random assignment) occurs when
a case’s treatment category is based on one or more of that case’s pretreatment characteristics (i.e.,
the assignment is not random) but, importantly, pretreatment characteristics that are unrelated to
that case’s potential outcomes.”). Three of the four articles that use judge assignment as an
instrument for causal claims (see our broader discussion of these works in supra, Section I.D.ii, and
infra, Section V.B) feature empirically verified, quasi-random judicial assignment, even if some of
the language (and titles) suggest truly random assignment processes. See Dobbie et al., supra note
39, at 201 (“This paper uses the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail judges to
estimate the causal effects of pretrial detention on subsequent defendant outcomes.”); Stevenson,
supra note 76, at 513 (“There is one centralized bail hearing room for the entire city, and magistrates
work a rotating schedule that creates random variation in which magistrate is on duty. Over time,
each magistrate will work an equal number of night shifts, weekend shifts, etc.”); Gupta et al., supra
note 141, at 477 (“The centralized location, large case load, constant process, and rotating magistrate
calendar result in the effectively random assignment of defendants to magistrates (an assumption
we test).”). The study by Leslie and Pope features a mixture of conditionally random and quasirandom assignments. See Leslie & Pope, supra note 76, at 530–46 (“We present evidence that
assignment to an arraignment judge is conditionally random for felony cases,” noting there were
“randomization issues in the misdemeanor subsample”).
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featuring certain defendants) or simply due to incidental relationships
between the assignments and the potential outcome of interest that would, in
expectation, be absent under a truly random process.
In order to verify that the judge assignment process does not feature
such biases and can therefore be used as an appropriate instrument in the first
stage of our project’s empirical design, we conducted a series of balance tests
on the CJC data. As we have previously argued in other work,173 it may not
be enough to simply run basic covariate balance tests, as those tests are only
valid to the extent they include the relevant pre-treatment covariates (the full
set of which is impossible to verifiably know)—just as with a researcherdriven randomized experiment (e.g., a randomized controlled trial), the
assignment process itself has to be explored and then incorporated into the
empirical balance tests.174 We also ran a second battery of tests using analysis
of variance (“ANOVA”) multivariate logit regressions, which test how
strongly those pre-treatment covariates are correlated with judicial
assignment. We focus on the balance tests here and discuss the ANOVA
tests in the Appendix.175 Nonetheless, the results of both approaches indicate
the independence assumption required for a valid instrument is almost
certainly met.176
173. See Thorley, supra note 171.
174. The balance tests we employ measure the distribution of various case and defendant
characteristics of the set of IAs over which each judge presided against the distributions we would
expect to see if the judicial assignment process was truly random (the latter of which we create
computationally). Our balance tests are made up of two data components: the actual observed
distribution of IAs across judges and a reference distribution of all the possible distributions of IAs
that were created through Randomization Inference (“RI”). The observed distribution is simply the
distribution of IA assignments in the dataset that we procured from the CJC. The reference
distribution is created by re-assigning the complete sample of IAs to the judges using the same
probabilities of assignment that existed in the observed distribution. To replicate the current
assignment procedure as closely as possible (and to account for time-fixed effects), we randomize
assignments in day-level clusters and month-level blocks. Using a sampling of 20,000
permutations, we re-assign each of the IAs to the same set of judges using the same set of
probabilities repeatedly to “create” 20,000 datasets that mirror our observed data, except that the
process of assignment is actually random. Combining these randomized datasets creates judgelevel distributions of each of the covariates we test. We then compute the 95% confidence intervals
for each of these distributions simply by finding the distribution values at the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles. If the actual value we observe in the court data is above or below these confidence
intervals, then we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of actual randomization for that particular
judge-covariate pair, strong evidence that the system of judicial assignment is functionally
equivalent to a truly random process. Note that an approximate Monte Carlo simulation is necessary
here due to the astronomically large number of permutations that our sample sets of cases would
produce. While still technically approximate, a simulation of 20,000 permutations will be more
than enough to produce test statistics that asymptotically approach the true test statistics under the
full set of permutations.
175. See infra Appendix B.
176. In both the balance tests and the ANOVA regressions, we use randomization inference, a
credible, non-parametric variation of Fisher’s exact test that allows us to compare the observed
distribution of IA assignments against the full set of hypothetical distributions of IAs in a system
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We ran these balance tests for the ten IA judges who were assigned 200
or more IA hearings from 2014 to December 2017 and a combined pool of
the judges and magistrates who were assigned less than 200 cases on the
following pre-treatment covariates: the sex of the defendant, whether the
defendant is Hispanic/Latinx (a proxy for race/ethnicity), the number of
charges brought against the defendant in their IA hearing, various binary
indicators for the types of charges brought against the defendant in the IA,
the number of previous charges of which the defendant was found guilty, the
age of the defendant at the time of the IA, and whether the defendant is a
Tucson resident.
The results of the balance tests are presented in Table 2 (below).
Column 1 of Table 2 specifies the judge,177 and the remaining columns report
the average or percent for each of the pre-treatment covariates we test, with
the p-value in parentheses. Because Table 2 includes the balance results for
141 independent tests (11 judges multiplied by 13 pre-treatment covariates),
the results that failed the balance tests after accounting for the multiple
comparison problem178 are set in bold.
In total, 13 of the 141 tests indicate a statistically significant imbalance
of a given case or defendant characteristic across judges. However, all but
three of these balance “failures” occur for covariates in the combined pool of
judges and magistrates, strongly indicating the assignment of IAs to these
particular judges is not random at all. This is not particularly surprising,
given the supplementary role of magistrates. They are probably more likely
to regularly take certain, unpopular shifts and are the first in line to fill in for
that is truly and perfectly random. See GERBER & GREEN, supra note 168, at 115. Using RI to
construct our p-values and standard errors is preferable to the standard approach taken in the
literature for two reasons: RI does not require modeling assumptions, and RI is intuitive and simple.
177. To protect the identities of the judges, we have anonymized all of the judge-level data
presented in this Article. Some may argue that knowing which individual judges are associated
with what data is even more important than knowing about the general disparities themselves, either
due to the general importance of transparency or due to the “shaming” effect that public disclosure
may induce on the judges’ subsequent behavior. While we appreciate both of these perspectives
(although we argue the effect of data transparency on judicial behavior is far from well-identified
in the literature), our purpose in conducting this study was not to publicly expose or critique the
Pima County judges. Additionally, our access to the data was contingent upon an agreement that
all judge-level data would stay anonymous.
178. While p-values below 0.025 and above 0.975 suggest a statistically significant difference
between the observed mean and the binomial distribution before accounting for multiple
comparisons, it is important to note that because of how many tests are included in our balance
analysis we should expect to see a number of natural “failed” tests (i.e., those with p-values low
enough to suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of as-if-random assignment) due simply to
chance, even when the IA assignment process is truly random. We can account for this problem,
often called the multiple comparison problem, by applying an alpha-correction, such as the
Bonferroni-Holm procedure which accounts for the number of tests and distribution of p-values to
re-calculate the level at which rejection should be made. See Sture Holm, A Simple Sequentially
Rejective Multiple Test Procedure, 6 SCANDINAVIAN J. STAT. 65, 66–68 (1979).
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others who are unable to abide by the initial shift assignments. In any case,
the imbalances are substantial enough that we drop the IAs assigned to this
combined pool in our instrumental variables (“IV”) analysis below.179
With regard to the remaining judges, the results of these balance tests
provide strong evidence the IA assignment process used in Pima County is
as-if-random, resulting in equivalent caseloads across those judges. When
comparing the judge-level values of our pre-treatment covariates against the
full distribution of those covariates under a judicial assignment scheme that
is truly random, only three of the remaining 130 balance tests failed (none of
which “survive” our multiple comparisons correction, so they are “true”
failures): Judges 4 and 8 have a very high proportion of Tucson residents and
Judge 9 has a very high proportion of IAs with a drug charge relative to what
we would expect. However, because these failures are rare and are not
clustered on one particular judge or pre-treatment covariate, the overall
results of the balance tests comport with the conclusion that those deviations
are most likely the result of conducting so many tests.

179. We also drop the IAs that do not have an IA judge in the data. As a result, the sample size
of IAs drops from 29,771 to 23,679.
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III. IDENTIFYING INTER-JUDGE DISPARITIES IN IA DECISION-MAKING
Now that we have established that the assignment of judges to IA
hearings in Pima County is done as-if-randomly and have provided a
descriptive introduction of our working dataset, we present two primary
empirical analyses. We begin here in Part III by measuring the inter-judge
disparities in IA outcomes, both across the entire dataset and across various
sub-groups of IA hearings. In Part IV, we then explain and conduct the
instrumental variable analysis that allows us to measure the downstream
causal impact that money bail has on defendant behavior and case outcomes.
A. Disparities in Assigning Money Bail
With one exception—which we explore below—all of the TCC judges
in Pima County were governed by the same set of rules and restrictions when
making IA release decisions over the entire time period that our data covers.
Additionally, as we described previously, the Pretrial Services Division
provided all IA judges with a report, which includes a release
recommendation. In interviews with administrative personnel before we
collected the data, we were told that IA judges follow these recommendations
for about 80% of IA hearings.180 One might reasonably expect, then, that any
inter-judge disparities in either the money bail assignment frequency or the
average amount of money bail assigned would be fairly minimal.
Our data do not support these conclusions, even with the understanding
that different judges with different perspectives and philosophies will
naturally produce some variance over time. Figure 1 (below) displays the
percentage of IA hearings resulting in the assignment of money bail by judge,
ordered from the most “lenient” judge (measured purely based on the
likelihood that the judge assigns money bail) to the “strictest” judge. As the
data demonstrate, there are substantial decision-making disparities across the
ten IA judges that are included in our dataset: while Judge 1181 assigns money
bail in only 20% of IA hearings, Judge 10 does so in nearly 60% of IA
hearings. Standard statistical tests182 demonstrate that this difference is
statistically significant at the p < .05 level, suggesting that the differences
between the judges are almost certainly not due to chance or statistical noise.
Indeed, other than the differences between the rates of assigning money bail

180. Telephone Interview with Pima Cnty. Superior Ct. Pretrial Servs. (May 15, 2017).
181. As detailed earlier (see supra note 177), we have anonymized all judges featured in this
Article. The judge numbers in Figures 1–2 do not correlate with the judge numbers in Table 2.
182. All of the figures in this Section run standard t-tests to compare the differences across
judges.
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among just four judge pairs,183 the rates of the other forty-one judge pairs are
also statistically distinguishable at p < .05.
These discrepancies are difficult to overstate. They indicate defendants
assigned to Judge 10 are nearly 40 percentage points more likely to be
assigned money bail as those assigned to Judge 1. Put more crudely, being
charged with a crime on a Friday instead of the following Monday increases
the likelihood of having to pay money bail to be released three times simply
because of the judges that happened to be assigned on those days.
Importantly, as we already established through statistical tests, all ten of
these judges were as-if-randomly assigned to the IA hearings in our dataset
and have a nearly identical corpus of IA hearings across measurable and nonmeasurable case and defendant characteristics.184 Consequently, the
differences in IA release decisions are not attributable to variations in the
types of defendants appearing in front of those judges or differences in their

183. These pairs are Judges 1 and 2 (a 0.9 percentage point difference), Judges 3 and 4 (2.7
percentage points), Judges 7 and 8 (1.7 percentage points), and Judges 9 and 10 (1.3 percentage
points).
184. While random assignment only guarantees that the distribution of hearings across judges
will be equal in expectation, the statistical tests discussed in Section II.D demonstrate that the case
assignments are equal in practice as well.
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cases. Additionally, because we are only focusing on judges with a
substantial number of IA hearings during the time period of the dataset, each
judge-level observation reflects decisions over an average of 2,379 IA
hearings.185
But what about the amount of money bail assigned by these judges? A
measure of judicial severity that relies exclusively on the likelihood of
assigning money bail may not accurately capture the impact that judicial
behavior has on IA defendants because a judge assigning money bail in over
half of his or her IA hearings (e.g., Judges 9 and 10) may nonetheless be
assigning substantially lower amounts of bail per hearing, posing less of a
financial hurdle for the defendant to overcome in order to be released prior
to trial. Alternatively, the judges who assign money bail in the fewest IAs
(e.g., Judges 1 and 2) may reserve such action only for the defendants they
deem to be the highest flight risk, danger to the community, or deserving of
detention. In other words, the amount of bail assigned may be just as
important as the existence of money bail itself.
To account for this phenomenon, Figure 2 (below) presents the average
bail amount (in dollars) assigned across the same ten judges (in the same
order as presented in Figure 1). We present bail amount in three ways to
account for some nuances in the data. The first column in each judge-level
group in Figure 2 is the raw average of bail amount assigned, where IAs in
which no amount was assigned are given a value of $0. The second column,
by contrast, omits data from all IAs where money bail was not assigned, so
the associated values reflect the average of only IAs with positive bail
amounts. The third column is a slight variation of the second, where extreme
outliers are excluded, so that the associated values reflect the average of only
IAs with positive bail amounts below $32,215. Because bail above that
amount is exceedingly rare in a dataset consisting solely of defendants
charged with misdemeanors, only fifty-three extreme outlier observations
were dropped.186

185. The ten judges averaged 2,368 IA hearings. The judge who presided over the fewest
hearings had only 413, and the judge presiding over the most hearings had 5,097 (the standard
deviation was 1,273).
186. As is often the case with outlier data, it is unclear whether these outliers result from some
recording error on the part of the Pima County TCC or a truly high bail assignment. The outliers in
this dataset, as defined by any amount above three standard deviations of the sample (which was
limited to only positive bail amounts for the purposes of these calculations), spanned from $40,000
to $750,000, with two particularly large groupings at $50,000 (26 observations) and $75,000 (12
observations). While these amounts are quite high for defendants only charged with a misdemeanor
(at least at the present IA) and might therefore be explained by an inadvertent extra 0 during coding,
27 of the 53 outliers come from only two of the IA judges (Judges 2 and 6), who are disposed to
assigning the highest average bail amounts even when outliers are accounted for, so it is not
unreasonable to assume that these amounts are genuine.
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The results in Figure 2 are similarly striking as those in Figure 1, both
in terms of the base-level disparities in bail amounts assigned across judges
and in the difficulty in finding a pattern in those disparities in relation to the
likelihood of assigning bail. Looking first at the raw averages in the first set
of columns for each judge (where a non-monetary release is coded as $0), we
see Judge 3, who was the third least likely to assign money bail, has the
lowest average bail assignment at $196 per IA. Perplexingly, Judge 2 has the
highest average at $2,548 per defendant, even though he or she is only
slightly more likely to assign money bail than Judge 1. In fact, there appears
to be no direct relationship between the likelihood of assigning bail and the
raw average amount assigned—the increasing order here being Judges 3, 8,
9, 7, 1, 5, 10, 4, 6, and 2.
This mixed relationship remains more or less the same when nonmonetary bail assignments are excluded from averages (the second column
in each judge-triad in Figure 2). Judge 2 is still the harshest in terms of the
average bail amount assigned at a staggering $12,000 per defendant, with
Judge 1 at a distant second at $2,800. Removing the fifty-three exceedingly
high bail amounts from the calculation (the third set of columns in Figure 2)
does not do much to change the overall ordering of judges, but it does lower
the averages of the strictest judges, suggesting that some (but not all) of the
difference was driven by outliers.187
Regardless of which calculation is the most accurate reflection of
judicial behavior, it is clear inter-judge disparities in the amount of bail
assigned are just as pronounced—if not more so—than whether or not bail is
assigned at all.

187. Combined, Judges 2 and 6 assigned a majority of the 53 outlier bail amounts (14 and 13,
respectively).
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B. Disparities Within Subgroups of Defendants
To shed light on how and why these disparities occur, we also present
data on inter-judge disparities across various sub-groupings of the data. We
begin with a comparison in the likelihood of assigning money bail before and
after the Pima County courts began providing IA judges with the Arnold
Foundation Risk Instrument scores for misdemeanor defendants in July 2016.
Recall that prior to July 2016, judges making pretrial release determinations
in Pima County were provided only with a report by the Pretrial Services
Division. After July 2016, however, judges were also given a risk assessment
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score that accounted for nine factors, including age, prior criminality, prior
failures to appear, and the seriousness of the current charges.188 While neither
the pre-July 2016 reports nor the Risk Instrument scores provided the judges
with any mandatory restrictions on their discretion at the pretrial stage, the
Risk Instrument was intended to function as a less-biased and more-uniform
basis for release determinations.

Figure 3 (above) displays the likelihood of assigning money bail across
the two time periods in the data. The first column in each judge-level triad
is the likelihood of money bail across the entire dataset (i.e., the same data
presented in Figure 1, above). The second and third columns are those
likelihoods before and after the Risk Instrument was implemented. While

188. See supra note 160 for a discussion of the Arnold Foundation PSA.
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five of the judges become more lenient in the post-instrument period,189 only
two vary in a statistically significant way (Judges 1 and 9), and those
differences are substantively small (roughly 3 percentage points each). As a
consequence, the striking inter-judge disparities observed in the full sample
of data are just as pronounced after the implementation of the Risk Instrument
as they were before. We highlight the implications of these findings further
when we discuss potential solutions to judicial disparity in Part V, below.
We also calculate the probability in our sample of each judge assigning
money bail across race/ethnicity and gender. These data are presented in
Figures 4 (below) and A2 (included in Appendix A: Figure A2). Unlike the
absence of variation in judges’ behavior before and after the implementation
of the Risk Instrument, there is variation in disparity across race/ethnicity,
particularly with respect to Black defendants. Specifically, some judges
assign money bail at different rates for Black defendants than they do white
and Hispanic/Latinx defendants. Judge 7, for example, is almost 5
percentage points more likely to assign money bail to Black defendants than
to white defendants (an 11% increase), and Judge 8 does the same at a much
higher 12 percentage points (a 26% increase). Conversely, Judge 1 is 6
percentage points less likely to assign money bail to Black defendants.
Overall, when considering all judges, the varying outcomes for Black
defendants range from a 6% lower likelihood of being assigned money bail
to a 13-percentage point increase in the chances of receiving money bail,
underscoring how the draw of the judge can have a consequential and
particularly varied impact on pretrial outcomes depending on a defendant’s
race/ethnicity.
Not unexpectedly, the assignment patterns vary across defendant
characteristics for the entire sample. The perfectly consistent lower rates of
bail for female defendants reflected in Figure A2 (see Appendix A), for
example, are likely explainable by the different types of charges that are
brought against female defendants. Inconsistent inter-judge disparities
across judges, however, are reflective of substantial amounts of judicial
autonomy mixed with differing perceptions and treatment of various types of
defendants. Some empirical caution is warranted here, as the number of
Black defendants in our dataset is low, and therefore statistical inference
becomes more tenuous, and in a few cases impractical because of low sample
sizes (see the empty bars for data on Black defendants for Judges 3 and 9 in
Figure 4). But our finding of inter-judge disparities in the way that individual
judges treat certain racial and ethnic categories of defendants further

189. Judges 9 and 10 increase the rate of bail assignment after the instrument is implemented,
and nearly all of Judge 3’s IAs occurred before the implementation, so a pre-post comparison is not
warranted or statistically feasible.
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highlights the importance of understanding how and why judges make the
pretrial decisions that they do.

IV. IDENTIFYING THE CAUSAL EFFECTS OF MONEY BAIL
Concerns about the disparities in the decision-making of IA judges
demonstrated above and the exploding rates at which courts across the
country assign money bail and detain defendants prior to trial come to life
when pretrial release determinations have an appreciable effect on a
downstream outcome with economic, policy, or rights-related relevance.
When IAs are randomly assigned to judges, some causal effects are
apparent without the need for sophisticated empirical techniques. We know,
for example, that a defendant assigned to a judge who assigns money bail at
relatively high frequency and high average amount (Judge 6, for example, in
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Figures 1 and 2, above) will inherently need to pay more cash to be released
than an individual who is assigned to a judge who assigns money bail at low
rates and low amounts (Judge 3, for example).190
As we emphasized in Section II.D, however, accurately identifying the
causal impact that money bail and pretrial detainment has on many of the
outcomes scholars and policymakers are interested in requires more than just
a simple comparison between those who are assigned money bail and those
who are not. Because those two groups are, as an inherent function of a
pretrial system that explicitly discriminates on criminal history and charge
severity, going to differ in ways that are almost certainly determinative of the
various outcomes of interest, a more sophisticated methodology is required.
While many studies have nonetheless attempted to make such comparisons
by carefully attempting to control for those confounding characteristics, we
argue that there are a limited number of empirical approaches that avoid the
problem of controlling for all observed and unobserved factors in a standard
regression model (also known as omitted variable bias) that has plagued bail
studies for decades. One such approach is instrumental variable analysis.
We begin this Part with a basic explanation of this methodology, along
with a discussion of what assumptions are necessary and why our dataset
meets them (we include a detailed technical explanation of the theory behind
the instrumental variable approach in footnotes and in Appendix C). We then
explore the primary results of the analysis on the full sample of IA hearings
in Pima County. To provide additional context as to why we see these
patterns, we also conduct the instrumental variable analysis on various subgroups of defendants and explain what the results indicate.
A. Instrumental Variable Design, Assumptions, and Outcomes
The cleanest and most powerful empirical methodology that can identify
the causal effects of money bail would be a randomized field experiment.191
In this hypothetical experiment, the release conditions (ROR, release on bail,
or detainment) for individuals who are charged with crimes and brought
before an IA judge would be randomly assigned to defendants completely
independent of risk factors, personal characteristics, or case characteristics.
ROR would be the control condition while release on bail or pretrial

190. See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text for how this might affect defendants.
191. Also referred to as randomized controlled trials (RCTs), field experiments are generally
considered by scientists as the gold standard for identifying the causal effects of real policies and
laws. For a comprehensive review of what field experiments are and how they have been used in
the social sciences, see GERBER & GREEN, supra note 168. For a review of how field experiments
have specifically been used by legal scholars to study law and policy, see also Donald P. Green &
Dane R. Thorley, Field Experimentation and the Study of Law and Policy, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC.
SCI. 53 (2014).
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detainment would be the treatment groups. These various “treatment” groups
could then be compared on whatever individual-, case-, or system-level
outcomes that one might be interested in (in our case, we focus on FTA, case
outcome, and rearrest recidivism), and because the groups were determined
by random assignment, any differences in the outcomes could reliably be
attributable to the pretrial release determination. In other words, we would
expect all three groups to have a statistically equivalent percentage of
individuals who are females, whites, and first-time offenders. We also would
expect that their unobserved characteristics are also statistically equivalent
(or “balanced”). Such a methodological approach would naturally come with
a bevy of ethical, practical, and popular dilemmas, so while the authors of
this Article are aware of some scholars and organizations considering bailrelated field experiments, to the best of our knowledge, no such studies have
been conducted at this time.192
The methodological approach we take in this Article—the instrumental
variable design—serves as a next-best empirical solution to the causal
entanglement problem that has also been utilized by the four empiricallydriven articles by Leslie and Pope; Gupta, Hansman, and Frenchman;
Dobbie, Goldin and Yang; and Stevenson.193 While a detailed explanation of
why instrumental variable design is better suited for the appendix (see
Appendix C), a basic understanding of the approach is important for
understanding the results it produces. Unlike a field experiment, where the
“treatment” is randomly assigned to individuals, instrumental variable design
takes advantage of some factor or event that is antecedent to the non-random
treatment variable but is, itself, randomly assigned. In other words, we use
an “instrument” that is randomly assigned and has an appreciable impact on
the variable that would ideally be randomized.194 In the context of a study on
the effect that the existence of money bail has on case outcomes or
recidivism, we know that the bail decision (the treatment) is not random, but
if the judge who makes that decision (and their associated relative leniency—
192. A primitive form of such an experiment occurred in the 1980s in Philadelphia, although
primitive methodological approaches and data problems limit the extent to which it can be used.
For an example of how the resulting data can be used, see David Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal
Bail and the Value of Freedom: Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON.
INQUIRY 750 (2011). We are also aware of a number of pending field experiments conducted by
the Access to Justice Lab in which the procedures used to determine pretrial release are randomly
assigned. See Current Projects, ACCESS TO JUSTICE LAB, https://a2jlab.org/current-projects/ (last
visited Nov. 17, 2021).
193. See Dobbie et al., supra note 39; Stevenson, supra note 76; Leslie & Pope, supra note 76;
Gupta, et al., supra note 141. These four articles are featured heavily in this Article because they
utilize similar methodological approaches to identify the causal effect of bail and pretrial
detainment, and because they produce (in our opinion) the most reliable causal estimates.
194. See Guido W. Imbens & Joshua D. Angrist, Identification and Estimation of Local Average
Treatment Effects, 62 ECONOMETRICA 467 (1994).
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the instrument in our study) is randomly assigned and the assignment to a
given judge is then determinative of the bail assignment, then we can harness
that instrument to draw out the causal effect of the treatment on our outcomes
of interest as if it was randomized itself.195 In our instrumental variable
design, the instrument for a given individual defendant is their IA judge’s
likelihood of assigning money bail or not (calculated using an average of that
judge’s IA decisions over the course of the study, excluding the defendant’s
IA outcome).196
Although instrumental variable analysis is a reputable tool for making
reliable causal claims, proper use of the methodology requires some
additional empirical assumptions, and our study is no exception. Again, we
provide a brief but necessary exploration of these assumptions here but
include the technical discussions of the results of the empirical tests in the
appendix (see Appendix C, Tables C1–C4).
The first assumption required in an instrumental variable design is that
the assignment of judges to the IA hearings is truly independent of defendant
and case characteristics. As we explored this assumption quite thoroughly in
Section II.D, we do not add any additional details here except to note that our
balance tests provided strong evidence that the “quasi-random” judicial
assignment system for IA hearings in Pima County appears to function as a
truly random process.
Second, the instrument we use in the instrumental variable design
(judicial leniency measures) must satisfy what is called the exclusion
restriction, which in this case means that the IA judge only affects the
defendant’s outcomes. Any other causal pathways between the instrument
and outcomes would constitute a violation of the exclusion restriction
assumption. In the context of our study, such a violation would occur if the
judge assigned to the IA affects case outcomes or recidivism through
anything other than whether the IA judge assigns monetary bail. As Dobbie
et al. emphasize in their analysis, if the defendant’s decision is affected
through other channels, then the estimates would incorporate additional
effects of these channels that are correlated with judge assignment.197
The assumption that Pima County judges are affecting defendant
outcomes through the pretrial decision is ultimately empirically untestable,
195. One technical clarification that is nonetheless critical to keep in mind is that the estimand
produced by this design is inherently the local average treatment effect (“LATE”) of bail, or the
average treatment effect for only the individuals who are on the margins of being assigned money
bail prior to trial, not the average treatment effect of detainment on all pretrial defendants. See, e.g.,
Dobbie et al. supra note 39, at 225.
196. This approach is commonly called a “leave-out mean.” We also calculate causal effects
using an alternative instrument that calculates the leave-out mean of the amount of money bail
assigned (in dollars). See Appendix C: Tables C2 and C4.
197. Dobbie et al., supra note 39, at 220.
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but we argue that, because of the institutional setting, the exclusion
assumption is reasonable. First, the judge assigned to the IA is not the same
judge assigned to any of the successive hearings in the trial and sentencing
phases of the judicial process (the two sets of judges come from different
courts altogether). When combined with the fact that the only substantive
decision that IA judges make is the assignment of bail conditions, it is
unlikely that the judges have any unobserved impact on case outcomes.
Second, the other actors in the process, including prosecutors, public
defenders, and private criminal defense lawyers are assigned through a
separate and independent process than the assignment of IA judges, making
it unlikely that judge assignment is systematically related to the assignment
of other actors in the criminal justice system.
Third is the monotonicity assumption, which stipulates that any given
individual not assigned monetary bail by a strict judge would also not be
assigned bail by a more lenient judge, and, conversely, that individuals
assigned bail by a lenient judge would also be assigned bail by a stricter
judge.198 As with the exclusion restriction, it is not possible to empirically
verify monotonicity, but a series of tests has been shown to provide a strong
indication that these concerns should be minimal. To test the assumption, we
examine whether our judge severity measure for monetary bail assignment
(our leave-out mean) is positively predictive of the bail assigned across
different subsets of defendants. Table C1 (see Appendix C) shows the extent
to which this assumption plays out based on the defendant’s criminal history
(i.e., whether or not the defendant has a criminal history), the defendant’s
race and ethnicity (i.e., whether or not the defendant is white, or whether or
not the defendant is Hispanic/Latinx), and whether the defendant is a Tucson
resident or not. The estimated coefficients in each of these models are large,
positively signed, statistically significant (even after multiple comparison
corrections), and roughly consistent across subgroups.199 Taken together, the
results support an assumption of monotonicity.
Finally, the instrumental variable design requires that the instrument has
a potent effect on the “treatment” variable (the assignment of money bail).
Part of verifying this assumption requires a showing of inter-judge variation
in the propensity for granting money bail. Otherwise, the “treatment” of
being assigned to one judge as opposed to the other judges would be wholly
unrelated to the outcomes of interest. The data and analysis in Part III, above,
verify this is the case in Pima County. Similarly, we must also show that the
judge an individual is assigned should have a significant relationship with the
actual existence, or lack thereof, of money bail in the individual cases. A
198. Imbens & Angrist, supra note 194, at 269.
199. Note that we obtain similar results whether we use our alternative leave-out measure—
logged bail amount or not. See Table C2 in Appendix C.
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standard least squares regression is sufficient here, and we show the results
of ordinary least squares (“OLS”) models in Table C3 (see Appendix C) that
estimate the effect of the binary bail assignment leave-out mean on the
assignment of bail. All model variations show a similarly strong relationship
between the leave-out measure and bail assignment, supporting the assertion
of a potent instrument in our data.
Using the instrumental variable approach, our analysis seeks to identify
the causal effect of money bail on three categories of outcomes: failures to
appear, charge dispositions, and defendant recidivism. Consistent with prior
literature, we measure case outcomes on two fronts: whether the defendant
pleads guilty of at least one of the charges brought against him at the IA stage
and whether the defendant is found guilty of any of those charges through
final adjudication by the court. We measure recidivism in two ways:
rearrest/recharge and reconviction.200
What we are defining as
“reconviction” technically is a conviction that takes place after a subsequent
rearrest in a given time period. Prior quasi-experimental literature in this area
almost exclusively measures rearrest recidivism. We believe measuring
recidivism in this manner will result in more nuanced empirical findings
about the timing and probability of recidivism events that will contribute to
the academic literature and to policy reform. We examine both types of
recidivism in six-month intervals (up to twenty-four months) beginning at the
date of the IA.
B. Analysis of the Full Pima County Sample
Table 3 presents the main two-stage least squares results for the three
case outcomes we measure: (1) whether the defendant entered a guilty plea
for at least one charge; (2) whether the defendant was found guilty of at least
one charge through a court judgment; and (3) whether the defendant failed to
appear at any point during the case.201 Because both the predictive, or
dependent, variable and the outcome in our models are binary, the
200. Note that our pre-analysis plan called for additional measures of recidivism, including
recidivism after pretrial release but before case disposition and recidivism after post-conviction
release. However, because we did not procure detention data, we do not include these variations.
A pre-analysis plan specifies the research, hypotheses, and data analysis that will be done
before the analysis is done on a project. The plan is submitted to a registry and is time stamped.
The process, which is common with medical studies, is becoming more common in law and social
science. It prevents researchers from “p hacking” and other forms of researcher manipulation. One
common issue is that researchers can run lots of regressions, but only report the results that achieve
statistical significance, resulting in the reporting of results with false positives and publication bias.
Our pre-analysis plan can be found at https://osf.io/jznd3/.
201. As we discuss in Section III.C (see supra note 167 and accompanying text), the nature of
the datasets we used in this analysis required us to determine the charges that were brought at the
IA using only a charge offense date and a charge disposition date. As a result, some charges
included as IA charges may include charges that were simply pending at the time of the IA.
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coefficients in Table 3 are best understood as the effect of being assigned
money bail (relative to not being assigned any money bail) on the likelihood
of whether or not the particular case outcome occurs.202 Columns 1 and 2 in
both tables report the unadjusted average outcomes for those not assigned
and assigned money bail, respectively. The most informative results are
found in Column 6 and were estimated using a model that fully accounts for
available control variables, including: time-specific variables that control for
the year, month, and week of the IA case assignment; case controls for the
existence of various charge-types brought at the IA (DUI, drug, disorderly
conduct, failure to appear, theft, trespass, and violent crime); and pretreatment controls for the defendant’s demographics and criminal history
(age, sex, town of residence, the existence of any previous charges coded as
the types previously mentioned, whether any guilty charges exist, and the
number of previous charges).203
Looking first at the estimated causal effect of being assigned money bail
on case outcomes in Table 3 (below), we see there is an increase in the
likelihood of a defendant pleading guilty to at least one charge for those who
were assigned money bail across all our models, with the models in Columns
3 and 4 producing statistically significant estimates of 9 and 7.5 percentage
points, respectively. However, the most sophisticated model (Column 6)
suggests that defendants assigned money bail at their IA are only 2.1
percentage points more likely to plead guilty and that estimate is not
statistically significant at conventional levels, so we cannot rule out the
possibility that the effect is not present.
We see even less evidence that money bail influences the likelihood of
a guilty judgment or a failure to appear. Our model predicts a mere 0.3
percentage point difference in guilty judgments between those who are
assigned money bail and those who are not and an only marginally larger
difference in FTAs. Substantively, these estimates are of much smaller
magnitude than what we expected coming into this study, as detailed in our
pre-analysis plan. 204

202. Note again that the estimand produced by our empirical models is the local average
treatment effect (LATE) of bail, or the average treatment effect for only the individuals who are on
the margins of being assigned money bail previous to trial.
203. The two-stage least squares results for models that exclude one or more of these controls
are presented in Table 3, columns 3–5. All models use robust standard errors clustered by judge
and year, which are then used to calculate the p-values.
204. For a discussion of our pre-analysis plan, see supra note 200.
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Moving to non-case outcomes, Table 4 (below) shows the impact of
money bail on rearrest and reconviction recidivism. Specifically, we measure
rearrest within six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months after the IA;
and conviction of at least one charge brought against the defendant within
six, twelve, eighteen, and twenty-four months after the IA. To the best of our
knowledge, these are the first causal estimates of the effect of money bail on
reconviction recidivism. Table 4 is constructed in the same way as Table 3,
with the exception that the extended time-horizons for recidivism outcomes
dictate that the sample sizes decrease as measurement-times increase (e.g.,
the sample includes 20,418 defendants who are observed for six months, but
the sample size drops to 11,688 defendants for the two-year period).
The base rate for rearrest recidivism for the six-month window is 20.1%
for those assigned bail, compared to 22.3% for those who were not assigned
money bail. The annual rate climbs to 28.6% after one year from arrest and
26.6% after two years from arrest, respectively. The instrumental variable
estimates for rearrest recidivism in Column 6 (our preferred model) indicate
that the causal effect of money bail on recidivism is, indeed, negative and
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decreases over time: The marginal individuals who are assigned money bail
are 9.2 percentage points less likely to be rearrested within six months, 6.5
percentage points less likely to be rearrested within twelve months, and 5.3
and 3.5 percentage points less likely to be arrested within eighteen and
twenty-four months, respectively. Of these estimates, however, only the
effect on rearrest at six months is statistically significant (p < .01) at a level
that survives multiple comparison correction.
The reconviction recidivism estimates largely mirror the rearrest
recidivism results. In our preferred specification (Column 6), we estimate a
decline of 5.0 percentage points in reconviction for a charge made at six
months for the marginal defendant assigned bail. Estimations of the
reduction of reconviction recidivism in the twelve-, eighteen-, and twentyfour-month periods drop to 3.7, 1.1, and .02 percentage points, respectively.
As with the rearrest outcomes, however, these longer-horizon measures are
not statistically significant at a reliable level, making the results suggestive
of a short-lived rearrest recidivism reduction from the assignment of money
bail.
Many of these results contrast with the conventional wisdom and extant
quasi-experimental literature we have discussed above.205 All three of the
studies that measure plea and conviction rates find a positive and statistically
significant effect of money bail or pretrial detention, with Dobbie et al. and
Leslie and Pope identifying causal effects of 10 percentage points.206
Likewise, these papers find a substantive impact on guilty verdicts (between
4.7 and 13 percentage points207), whereas our estimate is effectively zero.
The recidivism results are particularly surprising and contrast starkly
with the work of Gupta et al., Leslie et al., and Dobbie et al., all of whom find
increases in rearrest recidivism as a consequence of higher money bail or
pretrial detention.208 The results also cut against a more criminogenic
channel at work, where being exposed to the criminal justice system increases
the probability of recidivism over time, as shown in the work of Aizer and
Doyle209 and Mueller-Smith.210 Our results instead point to the possibility of

205. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
206. Dobbie et al., supra note 39, at 204–05, 277; Leslie & Pope, supra note 76, at 543.
207. Stevenson, supra note 76, at 532; Leslie & Pope, supra note 76, at 530.
208. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. One difference worth noting in the studies is
the instrument used. Dobbie et al., supra note 39; Leslie & Pope, supra note 76, and Stevenson,
supra note 76, all use pretrial release (or pretrial detention) leave-out means across the judges. Our
study, like Gupta et al., supra note 141, relies on a leave-out mean of the judge’s probability of
assigning money bail. We think the ideal instrument would be pretrial release or detention, but
because we were unable to obtain detention data, we relied on the assignment of money bail as our
instrument.
209. Aizer & Doyle, supra note 138.
210. Mueller-Smith, supra note 132.
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being “scared straight” once one is assigned high money bail, although the
effects appear to be short-lived, lasting somewhere between six and twelve
months. As we highlight below in Section V.B, we suspect these deviations
are reflective of the variation in our venue’s institutions, judges, and
defendant population, as opposed to meaningful differences in
methodological approaches.
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C. Analysis of Defendant Subgroups
In addition to the main causal effects of pretrial detention that we have
discussed above, Table 5 (below) presents results for subgroups of the full
Pima County sample. We compare three pairs of subgroups based on
defendant residency (Tucson County resident or not—Columns 1 and 2);
defendant criminal history211 (whether the defendant has a previous criminal
conviction in the CJC or not—Columns 3 and 4); and defendant
race/ethnicity (Hispanic/Latinx and white—Columns 5 and 6). Each column
of coefficients here reflects estimates using the empirical model that includes
all control variables (the equivalent of Column 6 results in Tables 3 and 4,
above). While comparing across subgroups does not allow us to make any
credible causal claims—for example, we cannot say that differences between
Hispanic/Latinx and white defendants occurred because of race/ethnicity—
they do give us valuable context for the primary results we discussed above
and help explain why the causal impact of money bail in Pima County
appears to be more moderate than it is in venues like Philadelphia and Miami.
The results in Table 5 (below) suggest that Hispanic/Latinx defendants are
driving recidivism reductions. If there is a meaningful percentage of
undocumented individuals in this Hispanic/Latinx group, these findings raise
two possibilities. First, the cost of recidivating may be higher for those
individuals than for the rest of the sample (e.g., deportation), meaning that
the Hispanic/Latinx sub-group may be more responsive to sanctions. Second,
our recidivism results rely on being able to link together various criminal
records across time, and undocumented individuals may be more incentivized
and able to use different names, resulting in an undercounting of subsequent
offenses for those individuals.
For case outcomes, we find that whether an individual resides in Tucson
seems to be driving the small effects on guilty pleas that we see in the broader
dataset. Of the defendants assigned to money bail, Tucson residents are 5.6
percentage points more likely to plead guilty.212
Treatment group heterogeneity results are more consistent when we
examine recidivism outcomes. In contrast with much of the literature, we
find that recidivism reductions for those assigned monetary bail are being
driven by individuals who have a prior conviction. The results are striking:
defendants assigned monetary bail with a criminal history were 17.8
percentage points less likely to be rearrested within six months, 26.9
211. Criminal history is of particular theoretical interest as it measures the individual’s
“closeness” to criminal activity.
212. With the exception of the failure to appear result for non-Tucson residents, none of the other
subgroup results for case outcomes withstand multiple comparison testing done by the BenjaminiHochberg correction. Consequently, those results should be taken with some degree of caution
since there is a possibility of Type I error (false positives).
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percentage points less likely to be rearrested in twelve months, 24.3
percentage points less likely to be rearrested in eighteen months, and 26.8
percentage points less likely to be rearrested in twenty-four months. The
results should be taken with some degree of caution because we did not have
a main effect for eighteen- and twenty-four-month rearrest, but we did
specify a subgroup effect in our pre-analysis plan and the results withstand
multiple comparison testing. The results for conviction on the rearrest charge
are similar based on the individual’s criminal history. Those with a prior
conviction that were assigned monetary bail were 16.0 percentage points less
likely to be convicted on a rearrest charge that was made within six months
of the IA. The estimate increases to a 19.1 percentage point reduction in the
probability of conviction when the window for the rearrest charge is extended
to twelve months. Both results are statistically significant at conventional
levels and withstand the correction for multiple comparisons as p < 0.05. As
we discuss in our limitations section (see supra Section IV.D), two nonmutually exclusive explanations offer possible explanations for the result.
First, the result might be explained by the greater legal acumen through
previous exposure to the criminal justice system, where defendants who have
already gone through the criminal justice system are more savvy in avoiding
a subsequent arrest. Second, marginal deterrence is also a potential
explanation where defendants have a stronger desire to avoid a conviction
because of potentially harsher sentencing.213 Finally, the desire to avoid
detention, having already been exposed to incarceration or other criminal
sanctions, could also play a role.
The results are particularly surprising in light of the study by Dobbie et
al., which found little evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity for rearrest
recidivism based on an individual’s criminal history.214 Though their study
in terms of analyzing this subgroup result is closest to our own, it is worth
noting that their analysis included felonies, and their instrument was pretrial
release, rather than the assignment of money bail. While other similar studies
have not examined treatment effect heterogeneity based on criminal history
for recidivism, to the extent that any effects are present, they would
contribute to driving increases in recidivism as a consequence of monetary
bail or pretrial detention, rather than the recidivism reducing effects that we
find.

213. Stevenson, supra note 76, at 537–38.
214. Dobbie et al., supra note 39, at 230–32.
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D. Limiting Factors and Other Considerations
Although our empirical tests suggest that the underlying assumptions
required to conduct the instrumental variable analyses are met, these results
must still be understood with some limitations and additional considerations
in mind.
Foremost among these potential limitations is the lack of incarceration
data in our analysis, which prevents us from verifying the mechanisms
driving the negative treatment effects we see for recidivism in the results
above.215 Criminologists, sociologists, and economists, among others, have
long shown that reductions in recidivism rates are largely the result of two
factors: incapacitation and deterrence.216 Criminal deterrence occurs when
an individual’s prior experiences with the criminal justice system or their fear
of future interactions disincentivizes criminal activity that would have
occurred but for the intervention of interest (the bail hearing and judge’s
pretrial determinations, in the case of our study). Incapacitation effects, on
the other hand, are simply the reduction in criminal behavior that results from
an individual being detained and therefore naturally less likely and able to
commit crimes. Without the data showing if and when individuals who were
assigned money bail were released—either as the result of finding the funds
to meet bail or through future changes in detention decisions by the judges—
we are not able to empirically show whether the treatment effects we do (and
do not) identify are due to incapacitation or deterrence.
Nonetheless, the results of our analyses combined with the descriptive
data presented in previous studies give us a reasonably clear explanation of
our findings. Although the Dobbie et al. study took place in large,
metropolitan areas (Miami-Dade and Philadelphia counties) and did not
exclusively focus on misdemeanors217 (differences that we have argued are
potentially significant), their dataset did include misdemeanor defendants,
and they were able to procure the post-IA incarceration data. They find that
among defendants who are released within three days of the bail hearing,
nearly half (41.4%) were assigned money bail.218 Additionally, they find that
215. Data on incarceration are not held by the Pima County Courts, and we were unable to
procure it from the agencies who do possess them.
216. For a more detailed discussion of criminal deterrence, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
1,
33–34
(Gary
S.
Becker
&
William
M.
Landes
eds.
1974),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c3625/c3625.pdf; Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of
Controlling Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation and Deterrence,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 307 (1981); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence and Incapacitation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 345 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000).
217. See Dobbie et al., supra note 39, at 231–32. Note that the authors did include a subgroup
analysis of misdemeanors in their online appendix, Tables A15 and A16.
218. Id. at 212.
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defendants charged only with misdemeanors were twice as likely to be
released as those charged only with felonies,219 lending further support to the
conclusion that the pretrial detainment periods for misdemeanor defendants
are likely very short, even when those defendants are assigned money bail.
Subsequent, non-experimental research specifically on misdemeanors in
Miami-Dade also shows that misdemeanor cases are resolved significantly
faster (51%) than felony cases.220 If those same characteristics are at play in
our data, any incapacitation effects would be largely limited to the days just
following the IA, meaning that the decreased recidivism rates that we identify
in our early periods (six and twelve months) are best explained through a mix
of initial, short-term incapacitation and mid-term deterrence.
Additionally, as with all pre-COVID-19 studies involving the criminal
justice system and recidivism, our results have to be understood in the context
of a world that looks much different than it did even two years ago. As we
highlight at the beginning of this article, COVID-19 wreaked a special kind
of havoc on prison and jail populations. Some jurisdictions took drastic and
unprecedented measures to address the crises, including the pretrial release
of all but the most dangerous defendants, regardless of whether they could
pay the bail that was initially assigned to them or moratoriums on any new
detainees.221 At this moment in time, it is still very much unclear as to
whether these emergency changes will impact future policies in the pretrial
space, meaning that our results—and any other pre-COVID-19 findings—
must be used to inform policy change only after considering the unique
cultural and institutional characteristics of the jurisdiction under
consideration.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
This Article provides critical data on two outstanding empirical
questions that must be answered before lasting change can occur: (1) How
much do judges vary in their bail determinations, even when they are working
in the same legal and institutional system; and (2) what is the impact of
money bail assignments on a defendant and the defendant’s case? We find
that judges vary drastically and that, at least in Pima County, the downstream
impacts of money bail are not as severe as many had feared.

219. Id.
220. Nick Peterson, Low-Level, but High Speed?: Assessing Pretrial Detention Effects on the
Timing and Content of Misdemeanor Versus Felony Guilty Pleas, 36 JUST. Q. 1314, 1324 (2019).
221. For a frequently-updated picture of where the post-COVID bail policies are moving, see
The Most Significant Criminal Justice Policy Changes from the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON
POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html (last updated Dec. 23,
2021).

622

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:557

These empirical results raise some obvious questions. If judges are
using their discretion to come to wildly different legal outcomes, should their
discretion be curbed? How might that be accomplished? And if the causal
impact of money bail is not as detrimental in Pima County as other empirical
analyses in cities like Philadelphia and Miami, what policy prescriptions
make the most sense? Similarly, are the disparities in empirical outcomes
across similarly designed (and equally valid) empirical studies suggestive of
a flaw in the way we are approaching the task of evaluating bail reform more
broadly?
In this Part we address these questions and—to the extent we feel it is
prudent—provide some potential solutions. We begin with the issue of
judicial disparities and then address the temptation to use the results of
studies like ours to create one-size-fits-all reforms.
A. Curbing Judicial Disparity
Our evaluation of inter-judge disparities in Part III provided striking
results. We verified, both through surveying the Pima County courts
regarding their judicial assignment protocols and through a battery of
statistical tests, that IA judges in Pima County have nearly identical
caseloads. Nonetheless, the “strictest” IA judges assign money bail three
times as often (60% of cases) as their more lenient counterparts (20%).
Furthermore, the strict judges assign bail amounts that are more than twelve
times higher ($2,500) than the most lenient judges ($200). These disparities
persist even after Pima County adopted a popular system for curbing the
discretion of judges in favor of a data-driven pretrial process. Similarly, the
varied outcomes across judges for Black defendants where the chance of
receiving money bail—ranging from a reduced likelihood of 5 percentage
points to an increased chance of receiving money bail as high as 12
percentage points—highlights how the draw of the judge can have a
significant impact on the pretrial decision. Although the Black Lives Matter
movement has primarily focused on policing, racial disparities in the criminal
justice system are buttressed by this pattern of judicial behavior.
In light of these results, the more difficult question about what to do
emerges. There are a number of options that jurisdictions across the country
have experimented with to reduce disparity. These range from “shoves” to
“nudges” in terms of the extent to which they directly restrict judicial
discretion.
Shoves. One option is to constrain judges by imposing mandatory
guidelines on their pretrial decisions. This possibility is very unlikely to have
any traction; in all likelihood, it would be unconstitutional, and there would
be strong resistance to what would be perceived as heavy-handed curbing of
judicial discretion. More common are the use of bail schedules, where police
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and judges or magistrates are given bail amounts based on the charge and
other factors. Although judges and magistrates have discretion to depart from
bail schedules—oftentimes more discretion than police—departures tend to
be the exception, and jurisdictions vary in the bail ranges they set for various
charges. One problematic aspect of bail schedules is that they often do not
take account of the individual’s income situation, and they likely result in
excessive bail setting for more economically disadvantaged defendants.
Nudges. More palatable options reside in the world of nudges, where
judges would have mandates limit their discretion. One possibility, which is
commonplace in most jurisdictions, is to have guidelines and bail schedules
that are voluntary. Federal circuit courts are split on the constitutionality of
bail schedules. Some courts apply a rational basis standard, finding that
money bail reasonably ensures a defendant’s return for a court appearance.222
Other jurisdictions have found that detaining defendants in the pretrial system
without considering the defendant’s ability to pay may constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation because the act of doing so constitutes excessive
bail.223 The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case that raised the
issue as recently as April of 2019.224 Although bail fee schedules are in place
in a number of jurisdictions, disparity is still prominent, as was the case in
Pima County. The likely reason for the persistent disparity in most cases is
a combination of judges departing from the bail fee schedule and the wide
ranges for bail setting within existing bail schedules. While seemingly
attractive, a reduction in the recommended range of bail for a given crime is
likely to be viewed as undermining judicial discretion, even though bail
schedules are generally not binding. Consequently, achieving reductions in
disparity through this type of reform would likely elicit pushback from judges
and is therefore not politically feasible.
Risk assessment scores and algorithms also offer the prospect of
reducing disparity, but the evidence is still at its early stages in terms of its
prospects for reducing disparity in pretrial decisions. Some of the most
recent and best evidence available shows that algorithmic risk assessment
does little to reduce disparity, and in certain instances, can increase
222. See, e.g., Katona v. City of Cheyenne, 686 F.Supp. 287, 293 (D. Wyo. 1988) (finding $35
bond to be rationally and reasonably related to assuring defendant’s trial appearance); Vasquez v.
Cooper, 862 F.2d 250, 253–54 (10th Cir. 1988) (distinguishing case from those where defendants’
sentences exceeded the statutory maximum term).
223. See, e.g., Pierce v. Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-570–HEA, 2015 U.S. Dist. WL 10013006 at
*1, *2–3 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015) (where the district court issued a declaratory judgment stating,
“[n]o person may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, be held in custody after an arrest because the person is too poor to post
a monetary bond,” and where the parties ultimately reached a settlement altering the jurisdiction’s
bail setting system).
224. Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1268 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1446 (2019).
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disparity.225 Our work descriptively shows that disparity does not change
much when changes are made to a risk assessment algorithm. While this
initial evidence does not preclude the possibility of algorithms reducing
behavior, our best evidence to date is that their use is unlikely to reduce
disparity.
One alternative we propose to reduce disparity is to inform judges of
their behavior relative to their colleagues. We believe this would very likely
reduce disparity. Although judges have a rough sense of which of their
colleagues are more versus less lenient, our experience through field
interviews and more informal conversations with judges is that they are
unlikely to be aware of the magnitude of the disparities. We also think
presenting the disparities gives judges information on which they can act,
while also not being violative of their discretion, which might be important
in individual cases and is likely to be more politically feasible since it does
not threaten judicial autonomy.
Although this idea has never been rigorously tested with judges, there
are some forms of similar information that have been disseminated to
adjudicators, and information that has been rigorously tested in other settings.
One close example involves immigration judges being informed of their
asylum grant rates.226 Because the intervention was not staged in a systematic
manner, the effects on disparity are unknown. A randomized informational
intervention or a staged rollout of such information for judges would allow
one to know the effects of such information on disparity. Randomized peer
effects studies in other areas have revealed welfare-maximizing behavior.
Studies informing individuals of peer behaviors in areas ranging from

225. See Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands
of Humans (IZA Inst. Lab. Econ., Working Paper IZA DP No. 12853, 2019) (examining the impact
of algorithmic risk assessment used for sentencing in Virginia and finding no evidence that risk
assessment affected racial disparities statewide but finding “a relative increase in sentences for black
defendants in courts that appeared to use risk assessment most.” The authors further state that
disparities increased for defendants under the age of 23.); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk
Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 309 (2018) (showing a law requiring the use of risk
assessment algorithms in Kentucky benefited white pretrial defendants more than Blacks, not
because of racially biased risk assessment scoring, but instead because “[j]udges from
predominantly white rural counties liberalized their bail setting practices more than judges from
more racially mixed urban areas, but within the same county, white and black defendants saw similar
increases in release”); Bryce Covert, A Bail Reform Tool Intended to Curb Mass Incarceration Has
Only Replicated Biases in the Criminal Justice System, INTERCEPT (July 12, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2020/07/12/risk-assessment-tools-bail-reform/.
226. One noteworthy effort made judge-specific asylum grant rates available in an accessible
format. The Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University collects
data and publishes it in an accessible format. TRACIMMIGRATION, https://trac.syr.edu/immigration
(last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
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voting227 to household power usage228 have consistently found conforming
effects.
B. Avoiding One-Size-Fits-All Reform
The inter-judge disparities we identify only address one of the
unanswered empirical questions we argue are preventing efficacious bail
reform. We also need to know how those disparities—specifically a given
judge’s or system’s propensity for conditioning pretrial release on a
defendant’s ability to pay money bail—affect the defendant and his criminal
case. The instrumental variable design we present in Part IV does just that,
and the empirical results were surprising.
Specifically, defendants not assigned money bail are significantly more
likely (5.1 percentage points) to fail to appear at their criminal trial. This
purports with the intuitive and traditional understanding that one of the
primary purposes of pretrial detainment is to ensure that defendants do not
abscond. However, we find, at best, an unclear impact of money bail on the
likelihood of guilty pleas and judgments and see a statistically distinguishable
increase in short-term recidivism (11.4 percentage points) for those assigned
money bail. In total, this suggests that assigning the marginal defendant
money bail will help ensure that defendants (and their potential victims) have
their time in court without any of the potential injury to the defendant or the
community.
Many of these results contrast with the conventional wisdom and extant
quasi-experimental literature we have discussed and endorsed above.229 All
three studies that measure plea and conviction rates find a positive and
statistically significant effect from money bail or pretrial detention, with
Dobbie et al. and Leslie and Pope identifying causal effects of 10 percentage
points.230 While the magnitude of our estimate here (5.4 percentage points)
is similar to Stevenson’s findings (4.7 percentage points),231 our result is not
statistically significant. Likewise, these papers find a substantive impact on
guilty verdicts (4.7 up to 13 percentage points), whereas our estimate is
effectively zero.

227. See, e.g., Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green & Christopher W. Larimer, Social Pressure and
Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-scale Field Experiment, 102 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 42
(2008).
228. See e.g., Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman & Alice Shih, Evidence from Two Large Field
Experiments that Peer Comparison Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage, 29 J.L., ECON., & ORG.
992, 1015 (2013).
229. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
231. Stevenson, supra note 76.
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The recidivism results are particularly surprising and contrast starkly
with the work of Gupta et al., Leslie and Pope, and Dobbie et al., all of whom
find increases in rearrest recidivism as a consequence of higher money bail
or pretrial detention.232 The results also cut against a more criminogenic
channel at work, where being exposed to the criminal justice system increases
the probability of recidivism over time shown in the work of Aizer and
Doyle233 and Mueller-Smith.234 Our results instead point to the possibility of
being “scared straight” once one is assigned high money bail, although the
effects appear to be short-lived, lasting somewhere between six and twelve
months.
Some will see these deviations and conclude that they are the results of
some meaningful differences in methodological approaches or, more
seriously, a flawed or substandard analysis in one or more of the analyses
(including our own). While errors are possible, we argue that such an outlook
reflects a well-meaning but ultimately short-sighted desire for one set of wellidentified results to provide a unified salve for the woes we are currently
experiencing in bail reform. Instead, we suspect these deviations are
reflective of the variation in our venue’s institutions, judges, and defendant
population. As we highlighted above in Section II.B, the Pima County data
we used in our analysis exclusively features misdemeanor defendants
arrested and charged in a population—non-Tucson Pima County—that is a
mix of suburban and rural communities.
These deviations consequentially call into question a one-size-fits-all
approach to pretrial justice reform. Rigorous policy evaluation work has only
begun in this area, and the bulk of the studies have overwhelmingly focused
on large urban centers in the Eastern United States. Our study shows that
results likely differ across geography, and even within geographic areas of
the country, varying in rural, suburban, and urban areas.
We think this variation motivates a multi-pronged approach to adopting
reforms of the pretrial system involving (1) rigorous experimental or quasiexperimental policy evaluation on a regular basis; (2) replication across a
variety of settings; (3) piloting and testing of interventions; and (4) reporting
of results across jurisdictions in order to encourage policy testing and
diffusion. Randomized or quasi-randomized experiments allow for legal and
policy interventions to be isolated from other factors, which are an important
ingredient for determining whether reforms work. This multi-step approach
combines rigorous policy evaluation, while also taking context-specific
factors into account. The reporting of the results across jurisdictions also
allows for the testing and implementation of appropriate reforms in similar
232. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
233. Aizer & Doyle, supra note 138.
234. Mueller-Smith, supra note 132.
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settings, resulting in data-driven reform that will be suitable for the
jurisdiction in which the reform is adopted. We think short-term goals
include the implementation of similar experiments in a variety of settings,
but longer term, there is a need for foundations and administrative agencies—
in this case, judicial agencies like administrative offices of the courts—to
coordinate programs that would promote the long-term viability of this policy
evaluation and reform model. Work of this sort will naturally curb the
temptation to generalize the results of one or just a few rigorously conducted
studies in a given setting to the broader criminal justice landscape and will
set the stage for appropriate policies to be implemented for a given
jurisdiction. In other words, it will promote a world where nuanced and
suitable reforms are implemented in the right settings.
CONCLUSION
Although the United States was already primed for a third wave of bail
reform coming into 2020, the one-two punch of recent BLM protests and the
COVID-19-induced health crisis in jails has made widescale change in the
country’s criminal pretrial system seem even more likely. Against this
backdrop, the empirical results presented in this Article highlight the need for
the desire for change to be coupled with an informed perspective of what is
actually going on in the pretrial system. We have demonstrated that even in
a system (Pima County, Arizona, in the case of our study) where the
institutions, laws, procedures, and defendant demographics are consistent,
the individual dispositions and propensities of bail judges can have an
uncomfortably monumental impact on whether or not a given defendant is
required to pay bail before being released from jail. Furthermore, we see that
these disparities in pretrial detention have consequences for case outcomes
and recidivism. Specifically, we show that being assigned money bail—
versus being released with or without conditions—potentially increases the
chances of a guilty plea, although these effects were not statistically
significant. We also find that those assigned money bail are less likely to
reoffend (whether measured by rearrest or reconviction), but the effects are
short-lived—lasting only six to twelve months, after which the effect
disappears. For sub-groups of the population, particularly those with a
criminal history, we find that the effects of money bail are longer lasting—
with a lower likelihood of recidivism lasting until at least twenty-four months
after the individual is released.
We explore several possible solutions to the problem of pretrial
disparity and argue that non-legal interventions such as simply informing
judges of their decision-making are both low-cost and effective. At the same
time, the results of this study clearly highlight the danger in adopting a onesize-fits-all approach to reshaping the pretrial system. The dynamics in rural
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and suburban courts are likely different than those in urban courts,
misdemeanor criminal charges are distinct from felony charges, and the
specific institutional characteristics of a given legal regime will almost
certainly interact differently to reforms than another regime. While this sort
of message is often perceived as the killjoy of progress, we believe that it is
only with an informed and individualized approach to bail reform that the
current climate can produce lasting and meaningful change.

2022] PRETRIAL DISPARITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONEY BAIL 629
APPENDIX
Appendix A: Supplemental Figures
Figure A1: Sample Pima County Initial Appearance Form

630

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:557

2022] PRETRIAL DISPARITY AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONEY BAIL 631
Appendix B: ANOVA Regression Analysis Supplemental Explanation
and Table
Although our balance tests suggest that the IA assignment process yields
caseloads that are balanced across all covariates, it is also prudent to test
whether the small imbalances that do exist are not correlated with judge
assignment. In order to do this, we conducted a series of time-fixed (month
of IA hearing) multinomial logit regressions of judge assignment using the
following covariates: sex, race/ethnicity (Hispanic/Latinx), age (years at IA),
residency (Tucson), criminal history (number of previous charges), and IA
charge type dummy variables (DUI, drug, disorderly conduct, theft, and
violent crime).235 In order to measure the individual predictiveness and
significance of these covariates, we use ANOVA tests to compare the
residual deviance (a measure of model “fit”) of this base model against the
residual deviance of a series of comparison models that each left out one of
the aforementioned covariates. By running an ANOVA test on each leaveout model, we can know how strongly each covariate is related to judge
assignment. Each of these comparison tests produced two measures: a
differenced residual, or the extent to which the leave-out variable was
predictive of judge assignment, and an F-test p-value.
The results of the ANOVA tests comparing the fit of the multinomial
logit regressions are presented in Table B1. Column 1 specifies the leaveout model against which the full model is compared, where the “Sex” model
is a regression of judicial IA assignment on all covariates except for the
binary variable for a defendant’s sex, the “Age” model is a regression on all
the covariates except for age, etc. Column 2 reports the differenced residuals
of the base model against the given leave-out model. While the exclusion of
each variable from the full multinomial logit model does result in a positive
difference in residuals—suggesting that there is a positive relationship
between each variable and the assignment of IA judge, only the relationship
with the binary indicator for whether the IA included a drug charge is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level once a multiple-comparison
correction is applied (highlighted in bold in Table 3).236 None of the other
ten differenced residuals approach a level that would suggest reliably strong
relationships. Just as with the three failures in the balance tests, the drug
charge failure is not expected with a truly random IA assignment process, but
alone it is not indicative of any systematic threats to our ability to utilize the
system in Tucson County to draw causal inferences. Additionally, to account
for any potential bias, we include the binary indicator for drug charges in the

235. We defined each of these variables for the logit regressions in the same way that we defined
them for the balance tests in Section II.D.
236. See supra note 178 for a discussion of how we treat multiple comparison testing.
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IA—along with the other covariates featured in the balance and ANOVA
tests—as a control variable in the first and second stages of the instrumental
variable design.
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Appendix C: Instrumental Variable Analysis Supplemental Explanation
and Tables
Our research design in this Article draws on the instrumental variable
approaches that have been used in similar studies that have used quasirandom assignment of judges to measure the impact of bail amounts on
similar outcomes.237
Identifying the unbiased causal effect of pretrial detainment decisions
on case outcomes and recidivism is deceptively difficult. As Gupta et al.238
and Dobbie et al.239 point out, one could simply estimate a linear probability
model of the following form:
𝑌!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙!"# + 𝛾𝑋!"# + 𝜖!"# ,
where 𝑌!"# is the outcome of interest—whether a case outcome,
recidivism, or employment—for individual i, in case c, in year t. 𝛼 is the
constant, 𝛽 is whether money bail assigned to an individual at the conclusion
of the IA, 𝛾𝑋!"# is a matrix of covariates with defendant and case-level control
variables, and 𝜖!"# is an error term.
While this equation serves as a simple model, it likely does not provide
unbiased causal estimates of the impact that bail has on the outcomes of
interest. Higher bail amounts may induce higher convictions and recidivism,
but the relationship may also result from other factors such as race, gender,
and criminal history. Judges, for example, are probably more likely to assign
money bail to defendants who are at the highest risk of offending, so any
positive correlation between the assignment of money bail and the propensity
for an individual to recidivate could actually be reflective of the causal
relationship between defendant characteristics and recidivism. If that is the
case, recidivism estimates will be biased toward finding that pretrial release
reduces future crime.
This causal entanglement is not new to empirical researchers interested
in studying pretrial detainment. As we outlined previously, some recent work
has homed in on the potential of utilizing random judicial assignment to
measure the causal effects of bail assignment and pretrial detention.
Following this recent methodological trend, our analysis relies on two
variations of a basic instrumental variables model to predict the impact of
pretrial release on potential outcomes. Our primary model uses the
propensity for a given judge to assign money bail in an IA as the instrument,
and the secondary model uses the average amount of bail assigned by a judge
as reported in Tables C2, C4, and C5, below. Our pre-analysis plan called
for the primary model to use pretrial release as the treatment (along with a
237. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
238. Gupta et al., supra note 141, at 479–80.
239. Dobbie et al., supra note 39, at 214–18.
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number of variations on release), but we were not able to access the release
data.
Both of these estimators are multivariate generalizations of the
instrumental variable models presented by Imbens and Angrist,240 where the
outcome of interest is modeled as a linear function of the treatment (the
assignment of bail or the existence of pretrial release), a set of “prognostic”
pre-treatment covariates, and unobserved error.241
Formally,
𝑌!"# = 𝛽$ + 𝛽% 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙!"# + 𝑋!"# 𝛿 + 𝜖!"# ,
where 𝑌!"# is the outcome of interest for individual i in court c, at time t. 𝛽$ is
the constant, 𝛽% 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙!"# is the effect of an individual’s bail assignment,
𝑋!"# 𝛿 is a matrix of covariates with 𝜖!"# as the error term, and the subscript c
denotes court-level specific effects (this is necessary because random
assignment to judges is done at the court level). Similarly, an individual’s
bail amount is modeled as a linear function of the instrument (assignment of
judge), a set of pre-treatment covariates, and unobserved error.
We follow the instrumental variable strategy developed by Dahl et al.,242
Dobbie and Song,243 and Dobbie et al.,244 where a residualized leave-out
mean is estimated for each defendant. Because we know that the judges and
magistrates who make bail determinations are not truly randomly assigned in
Pima County—for instance, judges can (and do) trade shifts and do not have
the same number of days of the week over the course of a rotation—a simple
leave-out mean could bias estimates. To take care of these time-related fixed
effects, we use fixed effects for the day of week, month, and year. These
fixed effects constrain the universe of defendants to those who would be
assigned to the same set of judges.
Our instrument thus takes the following form:
∗
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙!#
= 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙! − 𝛾𝑋!# = 𝑍'# + 𝜖!# ,
∗
where 𝑋!# includes the time-related fixed effects, 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙!#
includes the
judge propensity measure, 𝑍'# , and the error term, 𝜖!# , captures defendantspecific characteristics.
More formally, for each case, we calculate a leave-out mean in the
following manner:
240. See supra note 194.
241. We note here, as we did in the body of this Article, that the estimand produced by this
design is inherently the local average treatment effect (LATE) of bail, or the average treatment
effect for only the individuals who are on the margins of being assigned money bail previous to
trial, not the average treatment effect of detainment on all pretrial defendants.
242. Gordon B. Dahl, Andreas Ravndal Kostøl & Magne Mogstad, Family Welfare Cultures,
129 Q.J. ECON. 1711, 1720–21 (2014).
243. Will Dobbie & Jae Song, Debt Relief and Debtor Outcomes: Measuring the Effects of
Consumer Bankruptcy Protection, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1272, 1284–85 (2015).
244. Dobbie et al. supra note 39; see also supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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For each subject in the dataset, the individual instrumental value is the
assigned IA judge’s overall likelihood of assigning money bail in a given
time period (month-level periods) absent the bail determination in that
subject’s personal IA hearing. In other words, the instrument is the assigned
judge’s mean bail propensity excluding the result in the case associated with
the datapoint in question. This produces an instrumental value that captures
the variation across judges in the propensity for assigning money bail, which
is, importantly, a function of quasi-random assignment and therefore allows
for accurate causal identification. Results from the primary leave-out
measure (binary bail assignment) are presented in the body of this Article.245
Results from the secondary leave-out measure (logged bail amount) are
presented below.246

245. See infra Tables 3–5
246. See infra Table C5.
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